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ESSAY 
LAW AND THE FOURTH ESTATE: ENDANGERED NATURE, 
THE PRESS, AND THE DICEY GAME OF DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE 
By 
ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER* 
Building upon the story line of a current book project on the Tellico Dam case, 
this Essay explores a challenging reality of modem public interest lawyering-
the critical role of public perceptions and of the Press's role in shaping them. 
Most public interest attorneys come to realize that their lawyering must move 
simultaneously on two different tracks that determine outcomes-law and 
public opinion. This double task can be difficult and sometimes impossible. 
Both tracks require the organization and presentation of facts, but the two 
contexts can be quite different. A legal case requires proof of each technical 
element ofthe cause of action. On the other hand, the public's perception of the 
controversy is instead likely to be shaped by common sense facts that are 
selected and given meaning by the "perceptual franle" context in which the 
Press delivers them. The way information is initially presented shapes the frame 
through which it will thereafter be perceived by the public and the Press itself 
Once established, frames tend to hold. New facts contradicting the frame are 
more likely to be unperceived than to change the frame. The central case study 
in this essay is the notorious "snail darter" litigation. Farmers and 
• Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark 
College, October 2001; Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; petitioner and lead 
counsel in the extended litigation over ~he Tennessee Valley Authorio/'s Tellico Dam; Coauthor 
of PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw & POIJCY: NATURE, LAw & SOCIETY (West Group 1st ed. 
1992, 2d ed. 1998); S.J.D., University of Michigan Law School; 11.M., Yale Law School; J.D., Yale 
Law School; AB., Princeton University. I am grateful to all the staff and students of Lewis & 
Clark's Northwestern School of Law who made my time in Oregon such a useful and er\ioyable 
introduction to their school and to their state. Thanks to Laura Hendrickson, David Cole, and 
Justin Surber for assistance on theory, resources, and citations. All errors are mine. 
[1] 
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environmentalists in Tennessee, outsiders to the political marketplace 
establishments, tried to use preservation of an endangered fish species as 
leverage to block the Tennessee Valley Authority's Tellico Dam project. Over a 
period of seven years of extraordinary efforts, the environmental plaintiffs were 
successful in the legal process, but in the realm of the Press and public opinion 
were disastrously unsuccessful in getting across the dramatic facts that would 
have shown that good ecology made good economic sense. From this 
frustrating experience the Essay offers some analytical conclusions and some 
wistful suggestions for possible systemic improvements. 
I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people 
themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their 
control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, 
but to inform their discretion .... 1 
Thomas Jefferson 
Here is a proposition: Environmental attorneys, and especially public 
interest environmental attorneys, must constantly be aware that they-we-
are lawyering simultaneously on two very different yet concurrent tracks. It 
is essential but insufficient to put together and present the technical merits 
of a winning legal argument in the forums of courts or agencies. In most 
public interest cases, ultimate outcomes are likely to be fmally determined 
within the intricacies of the political process-local, state, or national. And 
while this second track requires that the rational merits of public interest 
cases are well presented in the internal processes of agencies or legislatures, 
that also is not enough. In many or most public interest cases it ultimately is 
the public's perception of the case that is the most important and 
determinative factor. What the public knows (or, significantly, does not 
know) of the case, ultimately determines outcomes. 
And where is it, in the rapid-fire daily complexities of modern American 
democratic governance, that the public almost exclusively gets the 
information that shapes its perceptions and its Jeffersonian "discretion"? 
From the important and frustrating realm of the Fourth Estate. The Press 
inevitably plays a critical role in the ultimate resolution of most public 
interest controversies, and its omissions (rather than its more often 
criticized acts of commission) are the central focus of this Essay and the 
three suggestions with which it ends. 
Warning: At one level at least, much of this disquisition is a legal war 
story, with all the dangers that implies. The kind people who invited me to 
present this Essay were warned that.I would be enmeshed this year in the 
project of writing, finally after twenty-five years, a book about an 
endangered species case in which, for seven years in the 1970s, my students . 
and I had the honor and the frustrating burden of representing an 
1 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), in 15 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 278 (Andrew A. Upscomb et aI. eds., 1903). 
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endangered two-and-a-half inch fish. The case is Tennessee Valley Authority 
v. Hill (TVA v. Hill),2 which pitted the final dam of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA), the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River, against the 
diminutive endangered fish, the snail darter. 
There are always dangers in the war story mode. If the storyteller won, 
the hidden message is "How smart I am!" (Not much of a problem here, 
because ultimately we lost. In retrospect, if we had been a little smarter, a 
river that had flowed for 200 million years would still be flowing.) There is a 
danger that storytellers will refight old battles long ago lost, will believe that 
what they have experienced deeply is a metaphor for everything else in 
human society, or will be the last to realize that the story has become old 
hat. 
But friends have urged that this case we experienced was important 
and has assumed something of the character of a classic.3 It touched 
hundreds of lives and dozens of legal and governmental institutions in 
interesting and revealing ways. Though I've been challenged by a number of 
other interesting legal experiences in the years since, this one is the case 
that has pushed me into more legal explorations than any other-equitable 
remedies, review of agency discretion, puzzles of legislative process and 
statutory interpretation, the critically useful role of citizen activism, and 
more. And this is the one that still wakes me up in the middle of the night. 
The case has had some useful consequences, but it also has hl:\.d some 
continuing and really bad consequences for the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA)4 and for environmental protection. TVA v. Hill apparently is still 
nationally notorious as The Most Extreme Environmental Case There Ever 
Was. Twenty years later the snail darter still resurfaces regularly in news 
commentary and editorials, congressional floor speeches,5 and Rush 
Limbaugh's diatribes against environmentalism,6 and the deprecating terms 
2 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
3 In a recent on-line poll of environmental law professors from across the country seeking 
a consensus on America's ten most important environmental protection court cases, TVA v. Hill 
received the highest number of votes, almost twice as many as the two cases that placed second 
(Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Dei Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) and Ethyl Corp. v. 
EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). Posting of James Salzman, salzman@wcl.american.edu, to 
envlawprofs@ darkwing.uoregon.edu (Oct. 26, 2001) (copy on file with author). 
4 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000). 
5 See 142 CONGo REG. H10,501 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1996) (Tribute to the Honorable James H. 
Quillen on his retirement from Congress) ("And Jim [was] persuaded that the fish couid get 
along just as well whether the dam was there or not."); 141 CONGo REG. S6423 (daily ed. May 10, 
1995) (statement of Sen. Packwood (R-OR)) ("We do not care if the snail darter disappears."); 
137 CONGo REG. S7848 (daily ed. June 13, 1991) (statement of Sen. Johnston (D-LA)) ("Ask 
hardworking voters to sacrifice in the name of the snail darter, and, if they are feeling polite, 
they will give you a shrug. H); 136 CONGo REG. H7508 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1990) (statement of Rep. 
DeLay (R-TX)) ("Because the rabid environmentalists felt it was more important to jeopardize 
the lives of our brave American serviceman than risk the death of a single snail darter."). 
6 
America today is a new homosocialism, communism. What these people are is against 
private property rights. They are trying to attack capitalism and corporate America in the 
form of going after timber companies. And they're trying to say that we must preserve 
these virgin trees because the spotted owl and the rat kangaroo and whatever live in 
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in which the fish is remembered makes our point and makes it worth a 
retrospective look 
The Tellico Dam was indeed an Extreme Case. From start to finish the 
public and the political process perceived it, through the Press, as the story 
of a trivial little fish discovered at the last moment by cynical environmental 
extremists who misused the fish and the law to block a huge hydroelectric 
dam. This story, however, was almost completely inaccurate, in fact 
backwards. Significantly, the case was extreme in ways 180 degrees 
opposite to the public perception, to the implied mismatch on the economic 
merits between the little fish and the TVA dam that Rush mocks with his 
listeners and even sympathetic observers seem to take for granted. 7 The dam 
had never made economic sense. The environmental argument for ~he fish 
and its habitat maximized economic as well as ecological benefits to the 
public. A retrospective look may thus cast a small but useful spotlight not 
only on environmental lawyering issues but also more grandly on how 
American government works. In the Tellico Dam case, as you so often find in 
the environmental law field, when you scratch away at the surface of a story 
pret~ soon you fmd yourself staring at big questions of democracy. 
MISTAKE 
In a nutshell, on the objective record, the TVA's Tellico Dam project 
was a major public policy mistake from the start. In our legal system, 
however, even if on its merits a project is irrational and destructive, there is 
no forum in which public interest advocates, outsiders facing the insider 
them, and it's the only place they can live, the snail darter and whatever it is. 
Rush Limbaugh, The Rush Limbaugh Show (radio broadcast, Dec. 7,1993). 
7 See, for example, the ethical point that is earnestly and empathically made while 
nevertheless assuming the extremism of the snail darter case, missing the basic facts and 
conunon sense utility merits, in a published anecdote concerning an environmental lawyer with 
a famous name: 
On a day in early June, Bobby Kennedy Jr. stands over the body of a decomposing fox, 
killed by one of his homemade traps that had been set after the rabid creature had 
menaced his children at his home in Mount Kisco, N.Y. Nature is his faith, and he 
recounts a conversation he'd had with a Catholic priest on a mountain top. "I kind of 
challenged him with the most difficult episode in the history of environmental advocacy, 
which was the snail darter case. 1 said, 'How did we allow this 2-inch fish with no 
economic significance to hold up a $1 billion dam project that would have provided 
energy and jobs to people? Why did we put fish before people?' And he said, 'That's not. 
what happened. We know at our core, as Americans, that if we lose a single species, we 
lose part of our ability to sense the Divine, to understand who God is and therefore what 
our potential is, as human beings.' Then 1 understood that God reveals himself through 
many avenues. When we destroy those things, whether whole species 01' huge 
ecosystems, to me it's the moral equivalent of tearing the last pages out of the last Bible 
on Earth." 
John Marks, Special Report: The Return of the Kennedys: Struggling Against Conservatives and 
Cynics, A New Generation of Activists Tries to Assert Itself, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 2, 
1996, at 42. 
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Establishment of an "Iron Triangle"8 pork barrel, can reliably trigger 
analytical scrutiny to obtain an accounting, and no way to "speak truth to 
power." 
Twenty-five years after its founding, TVA, the New Deal's brightest rose, 
had lost momentum and suffered from low morale. After building more than 
five dozen dams, it had run out of places where another dam could be 
justified. The agency had shifted ninety percent of its energy production to 
coal and nukes and was becoming just' another big utility company. But in a 
decisive turnaround meeting held at his Watts Bar Dam conference center, 
Aubrey Wagner, the agency's general manager and later chairman, 
resurrected the agency's spirits by launching a new initiative that would let 
them build more dams: Starting with a dam to impound the last thirty-three 
miles of flowing river left in the Little Tennessee River, the Tellico Dam, TVA 
would justify a new series of projects as "regional economic 
demonstrations. "9 
TVA had to come up with a positive benefit-cost justification. Every 
federally-funded public works project is required to have a benefit-cost ratio 
that on its face is at least theoretically positive; that is, that at least $1.01 will 
arguably be returned over time for every taxpayer dollar invested. 10 Because 
such water projects are primary components of the congressional pork 
barrel, this requirement typically stimulates great bureaucratic artistry in 
boosting the hypothetical benefits and minimizing the estimated costs of the 
projects that the Iron Triangles want to build. 11 TVA's Tellico Project, 
ultimately a $150 million spending opportunity, was such a case. When the 
agency brought it to the pork barrel appropriations committees in 
Washington for funding, the committees welcomed TVA's benefit-cost 
8 "Iron Triangles" in the political science rubric are the colluding political blocs fonned in a 
particular area by industry groups in the marketplace, by the agencies that fund or regulate 
them, and by their congressional supporters. Examples are the timber industry, United States 
Forest Service, and timber states' legislators; the barge and shipping industries, the Army Corps 
of Engineers, and southern delegations; and more. See FRED POWLEDGE, WATER: THE NATURE, 
USES, AND FuTURE OF OUR MOST PRECIOUS AND ABUSED RESOURCE 285-89 (1982). 
9 See WILLIAM BRUCE WHEELER & MICHAEL J. McDONALD, TVA AND THE TELLICO DAM, 1936-
1979: A BUREAUCRATIC CRISIS IN POST-INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 3-33 (1986) (describing the February 
13, 1959 Watts Bar meeting); see also STEPHEN J. RECmCHAR & MICHAEL R. FiTZGERALD, THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION: TVA's ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MISSION AND 
lNTRAGOVERNMENT REGULATION (1983). These two books are excellent sources of background 
data on the history and merits of the controversy and TVA's adamancy in pushing the dam in the 
face of the law and critical analysis on the merits. TVA can self-authorize projects if they fit its 
charter, and Wagner was seizing upon section 22 of the TVA Act, which authorizes "the proper 
use, conservation, and development of the natural resources of the Tennessee River drainage 
basin and of such adjoining territory as may be related to or materially affected by the 
development consequent to this chapter." Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. § 
831u (2000) (original version at ch. 32, § 22, 48 Stat. 69 (1933)). 
10 At the time, the benefit-cost requirements were set out in S. Doc. No. 87-97, at 4 (1964). In 
making the official project-justification calculations, the span of time and the interest-rate 
accounting for the cost of money have always been part of the manipulations, despite growing 
criticisms from critics including a few libertarians. 
11 See generally WILLIAM AsHWORTH, UNDER THE INFLUENCE: CONGRESS, LoBBIES, AND THE 
AMERICAN PORK-BARREL SYSTEM (1981). 
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projection with open coffers, as they do a parade of similar spending 
projects each year, despite questionable benefit-cost ratios. 12 
At the heart of TVA's project justifications for Tellico was a decision to 
acquire large areas of land that would never be flooded by the long, winding, 
shallow lake-more than twice as much private land was to be condemned 
than was needed for a reservoir, 340 family farms l3-and the theory was that 
this land would be re-sold and redeveloped as a model industrial city to be 
called "Timberlake New Town." At a cost of $850 million, including at least 
$145 million in additional "infrastructure grant;' subsidies that Congress 
would be asked to provide at some later date, TVA and its partner, the 
Boeing Corporation, said the hypothetical city would bring 50,000 people 
and 26,000 new jobs to the area. 14 The "shoreland development" benefits of 
this plan, along· with even greater hypothesized recreational benefits, 
allowed TVA to claim a 1.70/1.00 benefit-cost ratio (later modified 
downward).15 Because Tellico was such a marginal site, traditional water 
12 TVA had a dynamic ecological niche in the interlocked structural network of federal 
subsidy: construction agencies, congressional appropriations conunittees, and legislators desire 
to bring money into their districts and the local businesses into which subsidy monies would go. 
13 Of the project's 38,000 acres, only 14,000 acres of land would be seasonally covered by 
the reservoir. As a result of its New Deal genesis, TVA had the power to condenm land in an 
internal agency process using its own "assessors," not ajury, to set land prices. Thus the agency 
could take rich agricultural land, at the edge of a river and a<ljoining the Great Smoky 
Mountains National Park, for an average of less than $400 per acre. 
14 TVA planners hypothesized the model city would follow the design of a utopian city 
conceived by Athelstan Spilhaus in the 1940s, which likewise was never built. See TVA, 
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT: TIMBERLAKE NEW COMMUNITY 1-1-32 
(1976). Swatara, Minnesota, also considered building a Spilhaus utopia in the form of a 20,000-
acre domed city, which, after approximately $1.5lnillion in private and public money was spent 
on planning throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, was finally defeated in the 1973 Minnesota 
legislature due to stiff opposition and budgetary constraints. Once a Dead and Buried Idea, a 
Futuristic Domed City Shows Signs of Life, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 27, 1987, at 3C. TVA planners named 
the hypothetical city "Timberlake" after Lt. Henry Timberlake of King George Ill's colonial army 
who visited the valley and produced the first map of the area in 1762. WHEELER & McDONALD, 
supra note 9, at 169, 182. 
15 The official beI\efit-costratio as of the 1972 environmental impact statement: 
Direct Annual Benefits: 
Flood control 
Navigation 
Power 
Recreation 
Fish & wildlife 
Water supply 
Shoreline development 
Redevelopment 
Total Annual Benefits: 
Direct Annual Costs: 
Interest & amortization 
Operation & maintenance 
Total Annual Costs: 
$505,000 
400,000 
400,000 
1,440,000 
220,000 
70,000 
714,000 
15.000 
$3,760,000 
$2,045,000 
205,000 
$2,250,000 
Benefit-Cost Ratio [later downgraded): 1. 7: 1 
TVA, TELlJCO DAM PROJECT EIS 1-1-49 (1972). 
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project benefits were minimal-small potential increments in barge 
navigation, water supply, power generation (Tellico had no generators itself, 
but could redirect flows through a canal to an adjacent dam), and flood 
control. Despite the inevitable image of the controversy, the Tellico Project 
was fundamentally not a hydroelectric dam project. The dam was just the 
dubious central feature of a federal recreational and land-development 
project. 16 . 
Starting in 1962, TVA's purported project justifications for Tellico had 
been challenged and resisted by a motley little coalition of farmers, 
fishermen, Native Americans, historians, archaeqlogists, and others. 17 The 
case they made from the beginning was that the hypothesized benefit claims 
were unreal and irrational and the project's true costs would be staggering. 
TVA was eliminating more than 300 family farms on some of the richest 
agricultural soils in the world. Of the project's 38,000 acres, 25,500 were 
prime-class SOilS.18 The last remaining thirty-three-mile stretch of the Little 
Tennessee River was the best big river trout fishing resource east of the 
Mississippi, with special recreational values as a float-trip river, while 
twenty-four dams within fifty miles had eliminated all surrounding river 
. mileage. 19 According to the archaeologists, the river and rich valley lands 
had been inhabited continuously for more than 10,000 years, longer than any 
other site in the continental United States,20 and had been the heart of the 
16 It was never seriously questioned within TVA why an economic development project 
required a dam. Institutionally, it was well understood that the opportunity to build. another 
dam was the central motivation for the project and an essential part of the reinvigoration of 
internal agency morale. WHEELER & MCDONALD, supra note 9, at 3-33. TVA's most constantly 
voiced justification for insisting on a dam and reservoir was the so-called "Foster Hypothesis." 
Minnard "Mike" Foster, TVA's director of navigation 'and regional development planning, 
regularly repeated his intuitive assertion, incorporated into the agency's official benefit-cost 
calculations, that corporate investment would be drawn to Timberlake New Town by the 
particular transportation combination, at the Tellico Project's midpoint, of a railroad line, 
interstate highway access, and a barge terminus. See TELLICO DAM AND RESERVOIR, STAFF 
REPORT TO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES COMMITTEE (Jan. 19, 1979). The latter required a Tellico 
reservoir and canal. As it happened, the barge terminal lies choked in weeds, and appears today, 
after 20 years, to have been used only once, by a TVA dredging barge. 
17 Most people in East Tennessee are more sensible. The region had learned; when TVA 
wanted something, people lowered their eyes, kept their heads down, and didn't get involved. It 
was kind of like being in eastern New Jersey when Tony Soprano's organization decides it 
wants something. No development without a dam would be considered by TVA, and no one else 
was in a position to do anything. So many people undoubtedly made the pragmatic judgment 
that if any economic development was to come to the valley, which is a good thing, it would 
have to be on TVA's terms. 
18 The soils in the Little T Valley were United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
Class I, II, and ill soils. Of these, 15,500 acres were Class 1 and 2, now only rarely found in such 
concentration in any bottomlands anywhere on the planet. Peter Ailimain, Agricultural Plan & 
Statistics (Feb. 1977) (unpublished paper submitted to U.S. GovemmentAccounting Office) (on 
file with author). The USDA rates soils from Class I to Class Vill, with Class I as the richest level 
of soil in the world. DOUGLASS HELMS, DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAND CAPABILITY CLASSIFICATION, 
SOIL CONSERVATION SERV., READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF THE SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE 60-71 
(1992), available at http://www.nhq.nrcs.usda.govIRESS/econ/History/ LandClassification.html. 
19 ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND POLICY: NATURE, LAw, AND SOCIETY 
676 (2d ed. 1998). 
20 See Russell Cave National Monument, at http://www.nps.gov/ruca/ cave/cavelhtm (last 
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Cherokee civilization before Andrew Jackson sent the U.S. Anuy to move 
the Cherokee to Oklahoma. Echota, the Cherokees' Jerusalem, and five 
other Indian town sites lay within the project; Cherokee mounds still dotted 
the fields, arrowheads abounded, and medicine men from the Cherokee who 
remained in North Carolina after Jackson's forced removal still returned 
clandestinely to the valley to gather medicine from along the river banks.21 
The alternative options available for development of the valley-agriculture, 
tourism, industrial parks, recreation, and historical interpretation centers 
linked to the Great Smokies Park-constituted a valuable opportunity for 
maximizing direct public economic returns from the project area, not to 
mention the valley's extensive, unquantifiable cultural and ecological values. 
In retrospect, the dam was quite certainly a mistake. Although 
fortuitously the endangered darter has survived,22 its prime natural habitat 
and the function the darter served in that habitat as a legal bellwether for 
rational decision making have been wastefully lost. The citizens were quite 
certainly correct in their analysis of the benefits, costs, and valuable 
alternatives to the Tellico Dam. TVA waS massively wrong in its increasingly 
obstructionist attempts to promote and justify its dam and derail outside, 
scrutiny of the economic merits of the Tellico project. The Timberlake 
model city was never feasible, and Boeing pulled out in 1976, scuttling that 
part of the project.23 TVA pushed on, however, desperately bulldozing farms 
and trees, building new roads and bridges, and spending money in a "sunk 
cost" strategy, while they held off the citizen enforcement litigation. Yet, 
when citizens got an injunction, more than ten years after construction 
began (after $130 million, the vast majority of the project's expenditures had 
been spent), the Tellico Dam still flunked economic reviews. A federal 
Cabinet-level tribunal, the "God Squad," gave the Tellico Dam Project the 
visited Nov. 20, 2001) (providing detailed infonnation about history of Russell Cave National 
Monument). Russell Cave National Monument also has a 10,000-year record of habitation, 
though it was used primarily as shelter, not as a functioning community as were the human 
settlements along the Little Tennessee. 
21 See, e.g., WHEELER & McDONALD, supra note 9, at 48-49 (discussing Cherokee settlement 
of the valley prior to occupation by Colonial settlers). 
22 Through massive transplantation and the discovery of several small relict populations, 
the darter's ultimate survival seems assured, and it has been downgraded to "threatened" status. 
See U.S. }<~ish & Wildlife Serv., Threatened and Endangered Species, at 
http://www.ecos.fws.gov/servleVfESSpeciesRepoI1Jgenerate(lastvisitedNov.20.2001).To 
some this latter-day news exposes the litigation as an extremist sham and the ESA as Chicken 
Little over-regulation. Even in the narrowest light, however, ESA cases must proceed on the 
best information then available, not ignoring the Precautionary Principle in a wistful faith that 
environmental disruptions driven by the political marketplace will resolve themselves benignly 
at a later date. In larger terms, if endangered species inherently serve a societal function as 
"canaries in the coal mines" linked by their habitat dependence to physical conditions that have 
human importance as well, then that utilitarian function il' not likely to be resolved by 
transplantation. See infra note 37. The loss of the darter's major natural population in its major 
surviving natural habitat remains an unfortunate loss under the Act both for the species and for 
humans. 
23 WHEELER & McDONALD, supra note 9, at 182. There probably never was a serious 
likelihood that Congress would give Boeing and TVA the $850 million in appropriations and 
infrastructure grants necessary to build Timberlake New Town. 
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most searching economic analysis ever given to a federal water project. 24 
The 1979 tribunal's charge was to determine whether the dam was worth 
completing in light of its costs, benefits, and the river's non-dam alternatives. 
The tribunal concluded unanimously, in the words of Charles Schultze of the 
Council of Economic Advisors, that "[t]he interesting phenomenon is that 
here is a project that is 95% complete, and if one takes just the cost of 
fmishing it against the [total] benefits, and does it properly, it doesn't pay. 
Which says something about the original design!"25 
This was a case where the environmentalists' critical analysis of the 
project was not only correct in holistic terms, giving weight to intangible 
unmarketable values, but it also was overpoweringly right in direct terms of 
bankable market economics. Since then, not one economist, not even within 
TVA, has argued seriously that in retrospect the dam project made public 
policy sense on its actual economic merits. Tellico Lake today is a pretty 
reservoir in the warm months when it is not drawn down, it has many 
expensive second homes along its shores, with more and bigger boats than 
before, and industrial tenants in its industrial park, but the farms, forests, 
Indian sites, and trout fishing are gone, tourism is minimal, and the 
opportunities for coordinated econom~c development along the river and 
linkage with the Smokies Park have been frustrated. 26 When questioned at 
the turn of the centriry whether TVA felt that its project had lived up to the 
agency's benefit justifications, TVA's spokesperson said, "I can't answer that 
question. "27 
24 See DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, TELLICO DAM AND RESERVOIR: STAFF REPORT TO THE' 
ENDANGERED SPECIES COMMITTEE 2.1-.18,5.1-.5 (Jan. 19, 1979) (analyzing the costs and benefits 
of alternatives to the proposed dam); Robert Davis, Points that Seem Relevant from the Tellico 
Transcript-Knoxville 1-2 (1979) (unpublished notes from Robert Davis's presentation to the 
Endangered Species Committee) (on me with author); Robert Davis, Talking Points on 
Relationship Between the TVA Tellico Report and the Staff Report to the Endangered Species 
Committee 1-15 (1979) (unpublished notes from Robert Davis's presentation to the Endangered 
Species Committee) (on me with author); Robert Davis, The Consideration of the Tellico Dam 
and Reservoir Project Under the Endangered Species Act 1-13 (1979) (unpublished notes from 
Robert Davis's presentation to the Endangered Species Committee) (on me with author); 
Memorandum from Robert Davis, Chief Economist of the Endangered Species Committee, to 
the [Endangered SpeCies Committee] mes 1-3 (Dec. 22, 1978) (on me with author). 
25 Charles Schultze, Chairman of Council on Economic Advisers, Endangered Species 
Committee, Tellico Dam and Reservoir Project 25-26 (Jan. 23, 1979) (unpublished transcript of 
public hearing) (on me with author). 
26 There is always a problem contrasting what 'is with what would have been. Most local 
people never heard about the alternative development potentials for the valley and undoubtedly 
appreciate economic benefit from the extensive constnIction activity building resort homes and 
golf courses. It is difficult to remember what was lost and that most current development could 
have occurred without a danl-the citizens' plan included twice as much industrial park land 
and available second-home development along the river. If lakefront. homes were needed, there 
were dozens of other existing lakes where TVA could have given 4,000 acres to second-home 
development corporations (although Cooper Communities, the Arkansas developer owned in 
part by Wal-mart's Sam Walton, stated that it would have preferred to build its 4,000 acres of 
expensive resort homes along a river, as a number of resort developments had famously done 
along Arkansas's White River). 
27 Karen Nazor Hill, '70s Snail Darter Saga Began as Tern} Paper, CHATTANOOGA FREE PRESS, 
Oct. 11, 1998, at Cl. "According to TVA biologist Dr. Charles Saylor, there is no barge traffic on 
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But here's the problem: It is not enough that the citizens were correct 
on the merits of their argument that Tellico Dam was a mistake. The merits 
of challenged projects and programs are irrelevant unless they can be 
authoritatively established and (even more important) forced into the 
mechanics of the political structures that support those initiatives. And, as 
so often happens in public interest cases, the citizens' arguments on the 
merits missed the point of the players in the political process. As noted 
earlier, historical examinations of the case reveal that TVA's project was 
being built for unavowed reasons of internal institutional momentum, not for 
the avowed civic development purposes that the citizens spent their time 
cross-examining. In such settings, the only way to shift an entrenched 
agenda is to bring it into an open forum where its details will be assessed 
upon its public, rather than its clandestine merits. 
FORUM? 
What forums did the Tennessee citizens have available to present their 
case and force a reckoning? Not many, though they tried them all. Petition 
the executive branch? Whom? TVA? Department of the Interior? The White 
House? The Governor? No response.28 Congress? The citizens testified 
repeatedly to the pork barrel appropriations committees that hold annual 
funding hearings and were ignored, and prior to the discovery of the darter 
they were never able to get a hearing in the regular statutory oversight 
committees. The Press? No, the local press was strenuously uninterested in 
investigating a TVA project, and the national press paid little attention. So 
they went to court, where, starting in the 1960s, American pluralistic 
democracy showed the world that citizens have a right to participate 
meaningfully in their government.29 If you pay the filing fee, a judge has to 
listen to you, and if the facts and law are clearly on your side, you have a 
pretty good chance that the judge will apply the law. They first filed a 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA?O suit because TVA took the 
position that it did not need to file an. environmental impact statement (EIS) 
for Tellico.31 The citizens won the NEPA suit with the help of the 
the river. 
28 In 1971 the citizens got support from Governor Winfield Dunn of Tennessee, who begged 
TVA to drop the dam and to support agriculture and river-based economic development, but the 
agency rejected his plea. RECHICHAR & FITZGERALD, supra note 9, at 29-30; WHEELER & 
MCDONALD, supra note 9, at 142-43. 
29 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 19, at 376-77; see also Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the 
Beginning, A FUndamental Shift of Paradigms: A TheoIY and Short HistoIY of Environmental 
Law, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 981, 984-86 (1994) (discussing legal battle between timber industry 
advocates and allies of the northern spotted owl). 
30 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370e (1994 & Supp. ill 
1997). 
31 Envtl. Def. Fund v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806, 8lO (E.D. Tenn. 1972), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th 
Cir. 1972). TVA filed a draft environmental impact statement with the Council on Environmental 
Quality on June 18, 1971. However, because of its unsupported cost-analysis statements, the 
Governor of Tennessee concluded, "The interests of the state would be best served if TVA were 
to discontinue plans to impound the Little River." Letter from Gov. Winfield Dunn to Aubrey 
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Environmental Defense Fund and stopped the project for sixteen months 
until the court approved an EIS, but NEPA is only a procedural statute and 
an EIS is rarely a functional forum. As soon as the agency writes a statement 
noting alternatives and adequately cataloguing what it is going to destroy, it 
can proceed to do so unless the political process intervenes, and in Tellico, 
as so often happens, it didn't.32 
Where in this country's modem industrial democracy is there an 
operative forum to which stupendous mistakes can be brought for effective 
public interest review? Apparently the answer is "nowhere," unless citizens 
have money, power, or press enough to get traction and crack into the 
political process. There is nothing within the process itself that goes out 
looking for ongoing major agency or economic initiatives that need review,33 
and courts for their part do not willingly take on the function of project and 
program scrutiny. 
But it may be different where citizens can find and prove a substantive 
statutory violation in court, forcing the other branches of government to 
take account of the larger questions. Without an endangered fish, the 
American system of governance provided no mechanism for addressing and 
rectifying the ongoing mistakes of the Tellico Dam. With a fish, the dam got 
the highest-level economic review in the history of the American pork barrel. 
TWO TRACKS 
In October 1974, second-year law student Hank Hill (yes, as in Hill) 
walked into his environmental law profs office and told how the fish biology 
professor in a class his friends were taking had just found a small, hitherto-
unknown perch, an endangered species, on a large set of shoals at Coyatee 
Springs smack in the middle of the Tellico project; a fish that apparently 
existed only here because it had been extirpated in every other big river 
Wagner, Dec. 7, 1971 (on file with author). TVA responded with a seven-page letter, espousing 
only the economic benefits to be realized by TVA from the project. Envtl. Dei. Fund, 339 F. 
Supp. at 808-09. 
32 See id. at 811. TVA argued that NEPA was not retroactively applicable to ongoing projects 
and that as an emergency agency, created to resist the Great Depression, it was exempt from 
NEPA. The local federal judge, Robert Taylor, issued his first and only decision against TVA on 
a substantive issue, which was written by his sexagenarian law clerk Harvey Broome, who 
happened to be chair of the Tennessee chapter of the Wilderness Society. When the EIS came 
back for review, after Broome died, Judge Taylor quickly lifted the iI\iunction and allowed the 
project to continue. See Envtl. Def. Fund v. TVA, 371 F. Supp. 1004, 1015 (E.D. Tenn. 1973), stay 
denied, 414 U.S. 1036 (1973), aff'd, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974). The Tellico EIS, like most such 
agency statements, was a strong advocacy document rather than a straightforward weighing of 
costs, benefits, and alternatives. 
A procedural halt can be enough in some cases, allowing the political process to see and 
intervene. How does that work? If a project is stopped,· sometimes sister agencies or competing 
corporations can mount a charge. Or the press shows the project or program is a substantive as 
well as procedural loser. Or the proponent and its allies might change their minds themselves. 
But not here. 
33 Senator Proxmire used to issue annual Golden Fleece Awards to projects and programs 
he identified as wasteful, but that maverick process was scarcely a "forum" for review, and the 
good Senator and his awards are"no longer with us. 
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habitat in the Southeast by dams. "Do you think that is enough of a topic for 
a ten-page tenn paper?" 
At a hastily called meeting at Old Fort Loudon the next Saturday night, 
a contingent of us from the University of Tennessee College of Law 
discussed the prospects for another lawsuit with the fanners and other local 
citizens who had fought and lost the NEPA fight. Should the battered little 
coalition pull together and try once more with an action under the 
Endangered Species Act? 
The facts and the law seemed clear, we said. If you parsed section 7 of 
the Endangered Species Act of 1973 carefully, there were at least two causes 
of action hidden within its verbal foliage. Eliding the italicized words that 
follow, once we got the species and its critical habitat listed, we could assert 
two separate violations: 
Interagency Cooperation 
The Secretary [of the Interior] shall review other programs administered by him 
and utilize such programs in furtherance of the purposes of this Act. All other 
Federal departments and agencies shall, in consultation with and with the 
assistance of the Secretary, utilize their authorities in furtherance of the 
purposes of this Act by carrying out programs for the conservation of 
endangered species and threatened species listed pursuant to section 4 [1533] 
of this Act and by taking such action necessary to insure that actions 
authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopal'dize the continued 
existence of such endangered species or threatened species or result in the 
destruction or modification of habitat of such species which is determined by 
the Secretary, after consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be 
criticalY4 
The dam would eliminate the entire known population of darters and 
destroy its critical habitat. The statute was violated and an if\junction should 
issue. Asa McCall, old and grizzled, who for months had been holding off the 
TVA condemnation marshals with his dog and his shotgun and the presence 
of a news photographer, looked around the room and said, "I've never before 
heard of this little fish, but if it can save our farms, I say let's give it a try." He 
passed his hat around the room and the $29 collected in it that night was the 
start of the lawsuit. 
But even at that early meeting at the Fort, a strategic reality was clear 
to the citizen group: This case was not just a lawsuit. The attempt to save the 
darter and the river would have to proceed successfully and simultaneously 
on two separate tracks-in the courts and in the realm of public policy 
debate. Ultimately, it was the much broader context of political decision 
making where this case would inevitably be decided. Some situations are 
such that if you win in court, you win. But not here, given the plaintiffs' 
obvious weakness, the agency's power and desperation to assert a new 
mission, and the irreconcilability of the positions. 
34 87 Stat. 884, 892 (1973) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1)-(2) (2000)) (emphasis 
added). 
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On Track One we would have to work hard technically to win in comt, 
hopefully arriving at a permanent injunction on legal terms, on the narrow 
technicalities of section 7.35 But beyond the courts we had to be continually 
ready extra-legally to present and defend the rational solidity of our 
argument-to whom? To Congress, it seemed (because from the beginning 
we took the pos~tion that the lawsuit should lead to a "remand to Congress"; 
the courts would enforce the law, and TVA would then bring the controversy 
to Congress where we could get an informed decision on the merits36), and 
to the Public-in order to save the darter and the river. 
As to Track Two, we didn't use fancy language for it, but from the 
beginning the group was conscious of the impending public political 
reaction to the snail darter lawsuit, of the critical role of the media in 
shaping public perceptions, and in a primitive sense, of some important 
points of cognitive theory. 
You did not have to be a genius to sense from the very start that the 
public perception of this case would be important to its resolution. If we 
were completely successful in the courts, but only there, the little fish and 
the river valley would ultimately lose to TVA in Congress where the pork 
barrel committees were so powerful. It was easy to predict we would be 
accused of "hypocrisy," because our real objective was to preserve the river 
and its valley-yet we were "using" the darter and the Act instead of suing 
directly on the darn's merits (which of course was impossible).37 We could 
foresee a backlash against the ESA and against environmentalism generally. 
35 The lawsuit was the sine qua non. We had to do everything right in the courts and 
succeed in getting an iI\iunction to get traction and credibility-usually, if you are washed out in 
the lawsuit, you are all washed up in the political realm-and the iT\iunction is just the price of 
admission to the real game in Washington. 
36 This position, emphasizing that our ESA argument was not an extremist's absolutism as 
the press continued to insist on characterizing it, expressly invited Congress, not the courts, to 
do the ultimate deliberative balancing, which we hoped would give us an honest hearing on the 
merits. This is the argument that won the Supreme Court majority, built on Joe Sax's concept of 
"remand to the legislature" cited in our brief. "[T]he role of courts is not to make public policy, 
but to help assure that public policy is made by the appropriate entity." JOSEPH L. SAX, 
DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR CITIZEN ACTION 151 (1970), quoted in Brief for 
Respondents at 44, TVA v. Hill, 434 U.S. 954 (1977) (No. 76-1701). 
37 Were we hypocrites to bring the case? During the Supreme Court argunlent Chief Justice 
Burger implied that he thought the citizens didn't really care about the darter: The flsh was just 
"a handy handle," and "I'm sure that they just don't want this project, for a combination of 
reasons." Oral Argument of Zygmunt J.B. Plater at 60-61, TVA v. Hill, 434 U.S. 954 (1977) (No. 
76-1701). Whenever this accusation was levied directly or by innuendo, we would remind the 
accuser that the Act was concerned with endangerment, and Congress knew that the primary 
cause of species endangerment is habitat disruption, as in Tellico. Further, the function of 
endangered species was like the" canary in the coal mine," a utilitarian function keyed to the 
human consequences of disruptions of the species's habitat. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Tile Embattled 
Social Utilities of the Endangered Species Act-A Noah Presumption, and Caution Against 
Putting Gas Masks on the Canaries in the Coal Mines, 27 ENVTL. L. 845, 853-54 (1997) 
[hereinafter Embattled Social Utilities]. We would readily admit that Congress would not have 
passed ESA section 7 if it had speciflcally foreseen this case and cases like it. But statutory 
interpretation should not be a process of judicial rewriting of laws to accord with what judges 
think in their hearts that a majority in some past Congress would probably vote to do in a 
present case. Tellico did precisely what the Act generically prohibited. 
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But we decided that night to go ahead, (in)completely aware of the risks. 
The consensus we reached was this: We knew the dam was wrong, and we 
knew that we were right on the statutory law, but also that we were right on 
the economics and common sense of the case. One of the little group said: 
"Hell, our chances here 3:re not great. But can you imagine thirty years from 
now walking along the mudflats of a lake that has eliminated the river, the 
farms, the Cherokee sites, and an entire endangered species, that we say to 
our grandchildren 'we had the law and the facts and the economics on our 
side but didn't have enough faith in ourselves and the legal system to try to 
stop it?'" 
THE SNAIL DARTER IN THE NEWS 
So how did we anticipate the process of public perception? The 
discussion at the Fort focused naturally on the Press. We said to each other 
that, if we got an injunction, the story would be lifted out of the Tennessee 
Valley, where the politics and Press inertia on Tellico were insuperable, and 
into national focus. The story would undoubtedly start out with the "little-
fish-bites-dam" caricature, which would, in fact, serve the purpose of 
attracting the national attention we needed. In that we were correct. That 
caricature would hold sway for a few days or a week, we said to ourselves, 
but afterward the Press would need more fuel for its stories. As the court 
appeal continued, therefore, investigative reporters would travel down to 
Tennessee to dig into the details, reporting the dramatic truth about this 
controversy, and when America knew the facts the tide would tum. That's 
what never happened. 
When on Track One we successfully won an injunction from the Sixth 
Circuit,38 the story broke in the Press as predicted, focusing on-
[T]he celebrated case of Tennessee's snail darter, a three-inch fish that 
flourishes only in a 17-mile stretch of the Little Tennessee River .... In a 
decision that rocked the dam-building world, the Sixth U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals last week ruled that construction had to stop on the Tellico, even 
though it is 90 per cent complete. The $116 million dam has been building since 
1966 .... For the TVA, other dam-building agencies, and members of Congress 
who like dams, the list of endangered species is itself a growing danger .... 
According to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, its endangered species list 
includes, or will soon include, about 10 crayfish, 30 fish, 40 mussels, 40 
freshwater snails and one shrimp-all living in habitats imperiled by 
government dams.39 
But in the weeks that followed, in the brouhaha that began to escalate 
around the snail darter case, the Press almost never looked deeper into the 
story.40 The citizens poured time and effort into. a series of Semite hearings 
38 Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064, 1074 (6th Cir. 1977). 
39 William Chapman, Endangered Species Endanger Dams, WASH. POST, Feb. II, 1977, at Al. 
40 We actually did get a few stories that told details of the story, especially Washington Post 
stories by Ward Sinclair. See Ward Sinclair, Snail-Darter Ruling Seen Benefiting Taxpayers, 
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in John Culver's Environment subcommittee, convincing several senators 
and most of the committee staff that the ESA made sense and the Tellico 
project was far less desirable than the alternatives that preserved the· 
darter.41 The hearings were barely mentioned in the Press, however, and 
largely ignored by the rest of Congress. The focus in the Press and the 
congressional corridors remained on the' fish-versus-dam clicM and the 
portent of future blockages of public works projects by endangered species 
lawsuits. 
As the snail darter case approached the Supreme Court, working to 
sharpen the public perceptions of Tellico as well as working on the 
litigation, by a stroke of luck we managed to engineer an official inquiry into 
Tellico's merits in a little-known investigative forum. At the request of the 
House committee with ESA jurisdiction, the congressional General 
Accounting Office (GAO) agreed to study Tellico, and it produced a scathing 
report.42 The Comptroller-General's team concluded that TVA's justifications 
for Tellico "do not give a truly valid picture," were "statistically weak," and 
"inflated." The GAO report ended with an unusually decisive "Conclusion 
and Recommendation to Congress-The Congress should prohibit by law 
the Authority from spending any more appropriations for work on the 
project that would further endanger the darter" or be wasted if the dam was 
not completed.43 
So what did the "liberal" national Press say when this dramatic report 
came out? Nothing.44 
After waiting a few days with no pickups, the darter's supporters 
carried the GAO conclusions to reporters allover Washington. Still nothing. 
Only local Tennessee papers noted the report, and they focused on . TVA's 
WASH. POST, June 24, 1978, atA2; Ward Sinclair, "Pork Panic" Sweeping Congress in Wake of 
Darter's Rescue, WASH. POST, June 28, 1978, at A2. There was also a probing feature story in the 
Post that we put in all our press and lobbying packets and carried allover Washington. See 
Colman McCarthy, Tellico Dam: The Fish Is Not the Big Issue, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1977, at 38. 
Like the few others like it, however, it was a flash-in-the-pan and was never picked up upon by 
the rest of the national media or even by the Times. 
41 Endangered Species Act Oversight: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the 
Environment and Public Works, 95th Congo 205-41 (1977). 
42 See COMPTROLLER-GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: THE TVA's 
TEwco DAM PROJECT-COSTS, ALTERNATIVES, AND BENEFITS, EMD-77-58 (Oct. 14, 1977) 
[hereinafter GAO REPORT) (the GAO Report requested by Chairman Jack Muryhy and 
Subconuuittee Chair Robert Leggett of the House Conuuittee on Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries). The GAO is an agency of Congress itself, not an executive agency, established to 
inform members of Congress on complex accounting issues and beyond. 2 U.S.C. § 601(b)(4) 
(2000). This forum can be dramatically useful to citizens trying to obtain an authoritative 
confirmation of their analysis of challenged projects and programs, but the GAO needs to be 
requested by powerful congressional figures to do a study. The Tennessee citizens were able to 
get the request from two conuuittee chairmen through luck, legerdemain, and a small bribe, 
which is another story. 
43 GAO REPORT, supra note 42, at 29, 32. 
44 Reinforcing the author's recollection that no national press story reported the GAO's 
dramatic report, aLexis Nexis search revealed only one story even mentioning the study, 
written almost a year later. Dick Kirschten, Acting on Endangered Species, NAT'L. J., July 22, 
1978, at 1176. 
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rejection of it rather than the facts it reported.45 
In the Supreme Court, our brief and oral argument were stuffed with 
information on the GAO study, the critical congressional hearings on the 
project's shaky merits, rational alternatives, and TVA's unwillingness to 
consult as required by the ESA. After the Supreme Court decision in favor of 
the darter, which ignored all references to the fact\lal record on project 
modifications, the Press stories, virtually all on page one of the papers and 
lead stories on the evening news, were basically the same old fish-bites-dam: 
"Tiny Fish Wins, But For How Long?-The Supreme Court has ruled that 
work on a $116 million dam must stop because the Endangered Species Act 
expressly protects the river home of a three-inch long fish. "46 
After the Supreme Court decision, Congress's Endangered Species Act 
Amendments of 197847 sent Tellico into the God Squad tribunal's intensive 
economic scrutiny process. After six months of study and a full dress inquiry 
into the merits of the dam and the darter's river valley, the tribunal 
unanimously concluded that the dam did not make economic sense. The 
large majority of project expenditures were found to have public value even 
without completion of the dam. The darter was found to represent 
recreational, tourist, and developmental values including $40 million worth 
of prime agricultural lands. How was this astonishing reversal of received 
wisdom communicated to the public? The Court's stark decision had 
received front-page coverage all around the country. The turned-table story 
of the God Squad decision verdict-that the darter's case made economic 
45 Under the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, the agency that has been audited by the 
GAO must report to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on its actions taken in 
response to the GAO report recommendations. 31 U.S.C. § 720(b) (1994). TVA's chairman, 
Aubrey Wagner, wrote a five-page letter to Senator Ribicoff, the committee chairman, rehashing 
TVA's case for the dam, insisting that the GAO report was inaccurate and that it would be 
foolish to stop the dam, and ending with the complaint about delays created by judicial and 
administrative processes "which plague efforts... to overcome our social and economic 
problems." Letter from Aubrey Wagner, Chairman of Committee on Governmental Affairs, to 
Abraham Ribicoff, Senator (Dec. 13, 1977) (on file with author). He indicated that TVA would do 
nothing in response to the GAO report. Id. Under the statutory procedures, however, Congress 
need do nothing in response to the GAO report or to TVA's recalcitrance, and didn't. 
46 UPI wire service story, June 16, 1978 (predicting a rapid congressional override, with no 
mention of doubts about the dam's economics or the existence of alternative development 
possibilities); see also Warren Weaver, Jr., High Court Bar Danl, Reprieving Rare Fish, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 16, 1978, at 1 ("The Supreme Court ruled today, 6 to 3, that Congress' commitment 
to protecting endangered species of wildlife is so strong that completion of a $120 million 
Federal water project must be halted to save the last survivors of an obscure kind of tiny fish. "); 
The Darter and the Dam, WASH. POST, June 19, 1978, at A22 ("So the Tennessee Valley 
Authority's Tellico Dam does have to be stopped, on the verge of completion, to save a three-
inch fish."); Morton Mintz, Court: Dam Must Yield to Snail Darter; TVA Dam Must Yield to Snail 
Darter, High Court Rules, WASH. POST, June 16, 1978, at AI; The Fish Wins, NEWSWEEK, June 26, 
1978, at 99 ("It was a lawsuit that pitted David against Goliath-a 3-inch fish called the snail 
darter against a $119 million Federal dam project."); The Environment; Second Thoughts, . 
ECONOMIST, June 24, 1978, at 44 ("The triumph of the three-inch, impassive-featured fish, the 
snail darter, in the Supreme Court on June 15th, against the virtues of an $120m federal dam 
which is almost completed on the Little Tennessee river, might have seemed outrageous to 
many."). 
47 Pub; L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978). 
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sense-got page twenty-one in the Times,48 page twelve in the Washington 
Post,49 and was not even printed in most papers that took the AP wire. 
Television and radio, in deciding what to cover as headline news, rarely pick 
up stories buried that deeply. 
Tellico may have been one of the three most-reported environmental 
cases in the 1970s,50 but the coverage was almost exclusively superficial. 
Astonishingly, not one investigative journalistic foray into the intriguingly 
iconoclastic details of the case occurred, even after the God Squad's 
uniquely authoritative and dramatic reversal of the fish-dam caricature. 
IT MATTERS 
The consequences of the Press's failure to create an informed public 
perception of Tellico were significant and revealing, then and now. Consider 
three instructive examples. 
Hearings in Congress on the dam and the darter did not have the 
dramatic iInpact that our eighth grade civics teachers had led us to expect 
nor that the sessions' factual revelations warranted. When the darters' 
defenders started commuting to Washington in 1976 to maintain the second 
track effort on Tellico, we had to figure out "Who is the target audience for 
our information?" Did we have to address and reverse the common 
perception of TVA's presumed technocratic omniscience in Interior, in the 
White House, in Congress, or beyond? The answer was all of the above and 
beyond. Interior was easy. The Carter election gave us a Department of the 
Interior Secretary, Cecil Andrus, and a leadership group who, for a time, 
were less sensitive to the resource-depletion industries and pork barrel 
programs than their immediate predecessors and successors. 51 The White 
House gave us access to Domestic Council staffers for briefmgs on the facts 
and logic of the controversy, and the administration quickly defmed a 
position in support of the ESA and its application to the darter. 52 But we 
48 Seth S. King, Snail Darter and Whooping Crane Win the First Test of Species Ac~ N.Y. 
TiMES, Jan. 24, 1979, at A21. But see Government Panel Confirms TVA Danl Must Give Way to 
SurviVal of Tiny Fisll, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 1979, at 2. 
49 Margot Hornblower, Panel JllJIks TVA Dam; Cites Cost, Not Snail Darter, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 24, 1979, at A12. 
50 Prof. Ronald Rollet of the University of Michigan's Program in Environmental Journalism 
communicated this factoid to the author in 1980. The other two cases were presumably Hooker 
Chemical's Love Canal and the Allied Chemical Kepone disaster. 
51 The Carter administration was far more conscious of conservation principles than its 
GOP predecessors and successors, although it should be noted that the President who 
promulgated more environmental protection statutes than any other in history was ... Richard 
Milhous Nixon. See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES: A 
CHRONOLOGICAL COMPILATION OF SELECTED RELEVANT FEDERAL ACTS 355,357-59, supplement to 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAw & POLICY: NATURE, LAw & SOCIETY (2d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2001). Gerald 
Ford's Interior Assistant Secretary Nathaniel Reed was the one who, despite heavy pressure 
from his party, felt forced by the scientific and legal record to sign the official listing of the snail 
darter. Amendment Listing the Snail Darter As an Endangered Species, 40 Fed. Reg. 47,505, 
47,505-06 (1975) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.1l(h)). 
52 According to comments made to the author by White House staff, the economic faults of 
the Teilico Dam were discussed with the administration's first nominee to the TVA Board, David 
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soon learned that in Washington's day-to-day realities, it was Congress that 
held determinative power in the eyes of other official players. So was 
Congress then the prime target? 
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS 
Both the House and Senate subcommittees with jurisdiction over the 
ESA held three hearings on the snail darter and the ESA in the months 
following the Sixth Circuit's iIijunction, and the hearings records established 
on the merits of the Tellico Dam ir\iunction were powerful. 53 The 
subcommittee chairmen and their staffs became solidly convinced of our 
position's superior rationality. But we quickly learned this was not enough. 
"I wish there were more Members and reporters who could have been here," 
said Representative Bonior, after one dramatic session where several 
Cherokees and farmers testified about what would be lost with a dam and 
what could be capitalized upon with the river and darter preserved. But the 
hearing might as well never have happened because only three Members 
attended, they already knew the case, and no reporter had occasion to sit in 
on the hearing despite our placing it on the journalists' Day Book and 
scheduling a congressional balcony press conference for the Tennessee 
witnesses that morning. Hearing testimony gets printed .in a book that 
virtually no one will ever again have the time or occasion to read unless 
perhaps in the flesh it made a dramatic impression that registered on some 
legislator's antennae. 
How we envied the hearings that Members did attend. We would walk 
past a crowded door where a jumble of TV cables snaked in from the 
hallway, and it started to become clear. Members of Congress are busy 
people, constantly trying to keep their political profiles high. When they 
choose to come to a hearing it often is not to see and hear but to be seen and 
heard on lively mediagenic topics (and if a topic is too technical or 
intellectually nuanced, it is a difficult venue in which to shine). 
The Press and legislators are often linked in a political symbiosis, as 
one hearing session showed us with particular clarity. In a planned morning 
hearing session in the Senate subcommittee, we were going to present some 
vivid testimony on what the farmers and historical tourism developers could 
do with the undammed valley, and we wanted to be sure that it would make 
an impression. We phoned the Washington poses Margot Hornblower at 
home as she was eating breakfast and said, "You've got to come. This is the· 
core of the sensible argument for the darter and the ESA." "Who's going to 
be there?" she asked. "Farmers, an economist," we said. "No, I mean what 
Freemen, before he was nominated. 
53 Endangered Species, Part 1: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries & Wildlife 
ConselVation & the Env't of the House Comm. on Merch. Marine & Fisheries, 95th Congo 52-59, 
112-71, 231-47, 283-396, 534-44 (1978); Endangered Species, Part 2: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Fisheries & Wildlife ConselVation & the Env:t of the House Conwl. on Merch. 
Marine & Fisheries, 95th Congo 627-82, 728-91, 856-80 (1978); Endangered Species Act 
Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Res. Prot. of tIle S. Comm. on the Env't & Pub. 
Works, 95th Congo 6-23, 133-76, 178-300,357-93,516-49 (1977). 
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senators are going to be there?" "Senator Randolph is," we told her, because 
we had begged the senior senator's staff to have him attend. "O.K." she said. 
Then we called Randolph's office. "The Washington Post is going to be at 
this hearing," we said. "O.K." said his legislative assistant, "I'll try to get him 
there." 
The hearing began with Senator John Culver alone behind the curved 
dais, but after twenty-five minutes in came Senator Randolph and took a 
seat. The hearing took on a sense of importance., But after ten minutes of 
listening, Randolph turned to his legislative assistant, who then brought a 
scribbled note back to me sitting in the comer of the room. "WHERE IS THE 
POST?" Until Margot arrived twenty minutes later, our stock was pretty low. 
In any event, the story she filed54 was a disappointment, and Senator 
Randolph never became a power player in the darter's legislative process. 
But, thinking about this afterward, we realized that we, as well as Senator 
Randolph, had come to rank well-connected reporters in the top level of our 
structural chart of political importance. 
WHAT CONGRESS KNEW 
On July 16, 1979, Secretary Cecil Andrus wrote a dynamite letter to 
every senator, and on July 27 to every member of the House. After the God 
Squad verdict, Howard Baker and TVA had engineered a rider to overthrow 
the ESA injunction despite the decision on the merits. Andrus reminded all 
the members of Congress that they had appointed him chair of the special 
seven-member committee to scrutinize the Tellico Dam, and the committee 
had unanimously found that, "on the basis of economic considerations 
alone, the project is notjustified."55 The detailed three-page letter hammered 
down the hapless economics of the dam, the fact that it violated federal dam 
safety standards, and that better non-dam alternatives were available. On 
this record, Andrus said, "I intend to urge the President to veto the ... bill if 
the language on Tellico remains ... " and "I strongly ur.ge [you] ... to strike 
the Tellico language from the bill."56 
As the motion to strike the rider came to a vote in both chambers, 
appropriations committee members worked the floor with Howard Baker-
and the local Tennessee congressman, saying a No vote was obligatory to 
save Congress's traditional logrolling public works system. The factual 
public merits of the case were not the issue. The political merits of the pork 
barrel were. The darter and the river lost by one hundred votes in the House 
and narrowly in the Senate. 57 But how could this be, given the powerful 
verdict of the God Squad? Clearly, virtually every member of Congress knew 
54 Margot Hornblower, Wildlife Species Act Endangers Project; Change in Law Opposed, 
WASH. POST, July 21, 1977, at A3. 
55 Id. 
56 Letters from Secretary of the Interior ~ecil Andrus to Members of the House and to 
Members of the Senate (July 16,1979, July 27,1979) (on file with author). 
57 House Roll Call No. 427, 125 CONGo REC. 21,987-22,01l (Aug. 1, 1979) (TVA wins 214 to 
184 [36 abstentions]); Senate Roll Call Vote No. 269, 125 CONGo REC. 23,863-272 (Sept. 10, 1979) 
(TVA wins 48 to 44 [8 abstentions]). 
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that the dam's claimed merits were objectively false and the 
environmentalists' case was economically and rationally sound. The 
appropriations committees, like TVA, had known this for years. Hell, 
everyone knew that pork barrel projects typically could not withstand 
realistic economic scrutiny. Tellico was only unusual in that the facts had 
come out. But the majority of members wanted to vote against the darter 
and the Act for their own internal institutional reasons, and the only 
question was whether anything could force them nevertheless to vote on the 
merits. Congress, though it has nearly peremptory power in functional terms 
of day-to-day dominance of the political life of the federal government, does 
not operate on factual merits but on political merits. Its insider players, 
internal deals and alliances, and selective perspectives of self-interest 
dominate its day-to-day actions. What could have forced them to vote on the 
merits? A realistic threat that an informed public would perceive what they 
were doing. "The public interest" is not a meaningful standard motivating the 
actions of Congress, and the actual comparative public merits of the dam 
and the darter were not- particularly relevant in Congress unless they were 
actively perceived by the Press and the public. 
Deeply distressed, we realized that the issue was not what the 
congressional mqjority knew about Tellico and the ESA. It was that the 
congressional mqjority knew that America did not know the merits of the 
case, and probably never would, so they could vote their accustomed insider 
game with impunity. And they were right. The news story on the AP wire 
after the rider vote as usual missed the merits-"the multimillion dollar 
Tellico Dam had been blocked by a minimal fish, but now could be 
completed in the public interest." 
PRESIDENT AND PRESS 
But there was more. As soon as Congress passed the appropriations bill 
with the rider nullifying the ESA as it applied to Tellico, the darter's 
defenders and our NGO allies throughout the Washington conservation 
community, along with Secretary Andrus, began a campaign to persuade 
President Carter to veto the bill. The bill not only exempted Tellico, 
undercutting common sense economics and the ESA, it also killed off 
Carter's attempt to establish an economic review committee on all 
subsidized federal public works projects. Carter was to make his decision on 
the afternoon of September 25 and then board Air Force One to fly to 
meetings with civic and community leaders in New York City. With an hour 
to go before his departure, Carter decided to veto the bill, drafted a veto 
message for release after his departure, and we had begun preparations to 
defend the veto in the House and Senate in a situation where maybe at last 
America would see the facts. We waited anxiously. The White House had 
told us to be ready for a call. Two hours later we got a call patched through 
from the presidential plane. "Deacon is calling." "Hello, Professor Plater? I 
understand you have been working on this matter and wanted you to know I 
have decided it is best to approve the appropriations bill as it stands." To 
angry remonstrances that ensued he repeatedly said that signing the bill was 
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a tradeoff he felt forced to make "because the appropriations subcommittee 
chairman is insisting on this rider .... I think I am doing the best I can for 
the environment on this .... This is not an issue on which we can prevail." 
Later that fall (while pursuing yet another unsuccessful attempt to save 
the darter and the river by bringing a constitutional lawsuit to overturn the 
statute on First Amendment Native American freedom of religion grounds58), 
we learned what had happened in Carter's head that day. Friends in the 
White House reported to us that just before the President boarded the 
helicopter to fly to Andrews Air Force Base for the trip to New Jersey, Frank 
Moore, Carter's fellow Georgian and chief of liaison with Congress, had 
come into the Oval Office. "I hear you are planning to veto that bill with the 
TVA rider in it?" "Yes," Carter reportedly said. "The bill undercuts our 
environmental program and all the work Andrus's Committee put into this 
thing." Moore replied, "Mr. President, you cannot veto this bill. If you do, you 
are going to wake up tomorrow and in the papers all you'll see is editorial 
cartoons of you holding a Snail Darter in one hand and a Killer Rabbit in the 
other. You can't afford that kind of press. "59 Carter yielded, judging that even 
the President of the United States in a pointed veto message could not get 
this endangered species success story through the Press to the American 
people. 
The significant audience, it finally was clear to us, was not the 
President and not Congress. President Carter, a particularly weak executive, 
nevertheless reflected the general vulnerability. and dependence of the 
modem chief executive toward the power and volatility of Congress. The 
actions of Congress showed us that, for public interest advocates, the most 
practical constraint on Congress was the coverage and climate of the Press. 
We came to hold a very strong practical conviction: If the snail darter 
story had been covered by the local or national media on its economic 
merits, in a way that framed the conflict on those merits, the Tellico Dam 
project would long since have died, and a river that had flowed for 200 
million years would still be a dynamic national treasure.GO 
What did the snail darter case need from the media? Not just stories on 
the dam conflict. There were hundreds of those over the seven years of the 
58 Sequoyah v. TVA, 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), affd, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). 
59 The killer rabbit reference is to a story that had come out in the Press mocking Carter for 
being attacked by a swimming rabbit while fishing in the South one day on a vacation from 
Washington. See, e.g., Henry Mitchell, Any Day: Animal Animus and the Ripper Rabbit, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 7, 1979, at Cl; Kenneth Bredemeier, Carter Told to Yell "Shoo" at Rabbits, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 4, 1979, at A5. Editorial cartoons were regularly mocking Carter's diminishing 
political strength and his inability to conunand media attention. 
60 This is neither a novel conviction nor a novel experience for public interest advocates. 
Once, in Michigan, facing an attempt by the billboard lobby-one of the strongest lobbies in 
many state capitols-to push through a sham regulation that limited billboards to the size of 
40,000 square feet, our Environmental Law SOciety at the University of Michigan Law School 
stopped the bill in its tracks for a time by raising, for 20 minutes, a huge plastic tarp message on 
pylons on the state Capitol lawn: "If Senate Bill 517 passes, Billboards twice this size will be 
legal!" With swarms of reporters and TV canleras covering the episode, the bill was withdrawn 
and did not resurface and pass for months, after press attention had died down. 
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controversy. Rather, to inform public perceptions in a manner that would 
shape legislators' votes, we needed coverage that reported at least some of 
the details of the two very different views-ours and TV A's-of the dam's 
alleged benefits and costs, and most critically, the existence of non-dam 
alternatives. If the existence of this debate was reported, then further 
coverage might be expected to investigate and analyze the merits of the 
debate, especially if that coverage came in a nation-wide market medium. 
Further, we realized that ideally we needed coverage "with legs"-a rolling 
story with continually developing details and momentum that would carry 
beyond a one-shot appearance61-to create an ongoing "news climate" 
pulling in other media coverage and becoming a node of public debate. 
But in the Tellico Dam case, the political process was able to ignore the 
public merits of the controversy-ultimately finessing the snail darter 
through a business-as-usual maneuver of the pork barrel's insider game-
because, even though the case was getting lots of stories, those stories 
pictured it as a frivolous excess of hyper-technical environmentalism. Thus, 
the pork barrel was able to fly beneath the radar of the public's awareness. 
The public never heard even a hint that the snail darter iI\iunction might 
make economic sense. When America discovered that the dam would be 
completed, it was greeted as a rational outcome, which was long-expected, 
too-long delayed, and finally applied common sense to environmental 
extremism. (To the end, the people of East Tennessee never heard that they 
could have had far more and better development in the valley, keeping the 
river and the farms as well, and today TVA's Tellico reservoir is matter-of-
factly taken for granted as the only alternative that was available. What is, 
is.) 
WHY? 
Why didn't the Press and thence the public ever perceive and respond 
to the horde of available data, vivid images, and opportunities for policy 
analysis, dramatic juxtapositions, cultural and economic talismans, and 
warmly affirming possibilities of the Tellico snail darter story? It's a very 
useful question because so much turned on it then and now. Predictably, 
there is more than one probable and partially correct answer. 
WE TRIED 
The superficial nature of the Tellico Dam's press coverage was not for 
want of our trying. Over the course of seven years we spoke with more than 
150 reporters. (According to my notes, I personally spoke with 127 reporters, 
61 We had come to see that we didn't need just one national story. What did we need? A 
rolling story. A 60 Minutes segment would do it. Or a big investigative feature that gets 
attention. (Peter Mathiessen's article might have done it if it had come earlier because New 
York City press people really noticed it.) Why? Because it "takes" with the Press. It legitimizes 
the story so others can hop on and stay on it awhile. When we'd get a good story, we'd try to 
peddle it around, but it rarely got a pick-up. 
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some more than a dozen times.) To save the reporters research time, our 
press packets contained Tellico chronologies, good data, good quotes, Xerox 
copies of useful official documents, maps, pictures, some of the few articles 
detailing arguments on the merits, and contact references for farmers, 
Cherokees, and environmental spokespersons. Press coverage remained 
frequent but resolutely superficial. Disappointed with the torpor of the news 
beat reporters, we even traveled with photographs and press packets to the 
1977 National Outdoor Writers' Convention in Georgia. This group of rod 
and gWl journalists knew the richness of the Little Tennessee River and had 
voted a resolution against the Tellico Dam in the late 1960s. But by the late 
1970s, they were passive. "That's a news story," they told us. "We are sports 
reporters. Our readers don't want us to get into politics." We got CBS's 60 
Minutes and ABC's 20120 news magazines to film shows on the Tellico story, 
interviewing farmers, biologists, and economists and laying out the 
contrasting merits of the river and the dam. The programs never were aired, 
however. As ABC's Aram Boyagi3l1 told us, "We've had a lot of 
environmental stories lately." What would trigger a decision to run the 
segment? "If you fmd Senator Baker shtupping a milkmaid along the river, 
maybe that'd be a hook to run the segment."62 
Increasingly desperate as we realized how our truncated press coverage 
was serving TVA's efforts to override the dam's economic demerits and the 
ESA, we tried to recruit a pro bono PR firm. The PR firm said our case was 
exactly the kind of important public policy issue that they were interested in 
taking on. They would accept our case pro bono and carry its merits to the 
media, both print and broadcast. All we needed to do was provide them 
$15,000 to cover their expenses. Told that this was not possible-all of us 
working on the darter's legal and political process were volunteers surviving 
on T-shirt sales, potluck dinner fundraisers, personal credit cards, and the 
kindness of hospitable activists willing to share their lodgings-they 
regretfully bowed out. 
We then appealed to Ben Badikian. Bagdikian was ombudsman for the 
Washington Post and one of America's most respected journalists, a Pulitzer 
Prize winner, author of The Media Monopoly, and subsequently dean of UC-
Berkeley's journalism school. As ombudsman; he was charged with 
independent overview of the accuracy and integrity of the poses coverage. 
Usually he dealt with complaints about what reporters wrote, not what they 
did not write. We catalogued our frustrations in getting the editors to give 
adequate coverage of the dramatic but complex realities of the Tellico Dam 
conflict, and the illlfortunate political consequences that resulted from this 
lack of coverage. Even the poses Ward Sinclair, the best reporter we had 
encountered, was not able to get his editors' permission to dig deeper into 
the story. Bagdikian sighed and told us that he understood our problem, but 
62 When Dan Rather saw a report from Tennessee after the dam closure, which showed Nell 
McCall and other dispossessed farmers WlSuccessfully attempting to buy back their own 
unflooded lands at auction, Kathie Moore, his producer for that story, told us: "I didn't have the 
heart to tell him we ha'd filmed the story for 60 Minutes but never could find a good time to run 
it." 
HeinOnline -- 32 Envtl. L. 24 2002
24 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 32:1 
it was an inherent problem in journalism. It was an issue that bothered his 
students too. Stories don't get covered just because they deserve to be 
covered, or need to be covered for the sake of accurate informed public 
debate. He was sorry, but there was nothing he could do. 
During the endgame, the day after the pork barrel process overrode our 
statutory injunction, we held a press conference that, finally, attracted more 
than a dozen reporters. As they listened to our frustrated laying out of the 
real merits of the conflict, one of the reporters-Phil Shabecoff of the New 
York Times-grew increasingly angry, and then burst out, "Why are you only 
telling us this now!? Why didn't you tell us this earlier so we could have 
covered the story!?" I proceeded to lose self-control. "Sir, we have been 
calling your offices, sending you fact sheets and position papers, setting up 
interview conferences on the Day Book with the farmers, Cherokees, and 
biologists for the past three years. I personally have dropped press packets 
into your box at the Press building at least twice in the past year. Don't 
blame us for this. Where the hell were you all this time?!?" 
ONE BASIC PROBLEM: HUMAN COGNITION AND PERCEPTUAL FRAMES 
Part of the reason that the Press could not or would not penetrate the 
details of this internationally notorious case may lie within the peculiarities 
of how humans-the Press and their public audience alike-process 
information. In terms of cognitive theory, we never were able to resolve a 
fundamental problem in perception processing. We didn't understand why 
the accumulation of intriguing facts within the case did not get through to 
the Press, the public, and the political process. Why was it always the "little-
fish-big-dam" cliche? In retrospect, the answer should have been obvious. 
Some of the players in the political process-TVA, the pork barrel 
committees, the anti-regulation movement, and its lobbyists-were 
extremely well-served by the caricature and would be threatened by the 
merits and lessons of the snail darter case. But why did the Press stay with 
the cliche? We came to the conclusion that it was because the cliche was a 
succinct, interesting, and conveniently fitting way to frame the story. 
Humans are continually bombarded with a welter of information factoids 
and must impose frameworks upon them in order to derive understanding 
and meaning. Building on Kenneth Boulding's pioneer work in the field,63 
you can think of these processing structures as the "perceptual frames" 
63 KENNETH BOULDING, THE IMAGE 7-13 (1956). Boulding began the inquiry into how human 
minds process complex facts through interpretive "images" that can hide or reinforce 
perception of facts, as well as the process by which additional new facts can occasionally but 
not easily change the original interpretive image. These concepts are now well established in 
modem journalism scholarship. See Carol M. Liebler & Jacob Bendix, Old Growth Forests on 
Network News: News Sources and the Franling of an Enviromnental Controversy, 73 
JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 53, 53 (1996) (examining how networks reflected particular 
positions through choice of visuals, sources, and summary remarks); PAMELA SHOEMAKER & 
STEPHEN D. REESE, MEDIATING THE MESSAGE: THEORIES OF INFLUENCES O~ MAss MEDIA CONTENT 
(1991) (looking at factors that shape mass media in an attempt to develop a comprehensive 
theory of media content). 
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(PFs) through which people discern and understand what is presented to 
them. Facts that fit the terms of a perceptual frame get organized by the 
frame into a comprehensible structure. More perversely; facts that do not fit 
a perceptual frame are not cognitively acknowledged; they may not be 
perceived at all. To some extent the Press and the public could not see the 
facts or the story's intriguing twists that ended up supporting the darter and 
the river.64 
Before the darter, Tellico Dam had probably been perceived from 
outside Tennessee through the perceptual frame of the New Deal's TVA, an 
image in which massive dams with roaring spillways bring the backward 
region into the twentieth century. Once the snail darter lawsuit was filed, the 
citizens had consciously realized that the case inevitably would initially be 
perceived as "little-fish-big-dam," but we thought that perception would 
change as more information was brought to bear. It was hard to understand 
how persistent the little-fish-big-dam perceptual frame would be. Reporters' 
and legislators' eyes glazed over when the citizens rolled out maps, reports, 
and documents showing the weaknesses of the dam and the beneficial role 
of the endangered species in facilitating alternative development of the 
Valley. The fish/dam rubric is quick, easy, funny, and comforting. It is 
discomfiting and hard, on the other hand, for reporters and their audiences 
to devote energetic attention to a complex and disruptively contrary image 
that is not so familiar and crisp. 
FISH AS DAVID ... FISH AS CANARY? 
Consider the further dimensions of the fish/dam frame. It invokes a 
David and Goliath image, which to a certain degree should be helpful to the 
little fish because everyone knows David was the good guy. But what lies 
behind this? Perniciously, the juxtaposition invites a less affirmative 
polarization: "What's more important, Bugs, Trees, and Fish, or the interests 
of Humans?" Even worse, this perceptual frame invokes the classic put-
down of environmentalism, the often-alleged fundamental Unavoidable 
Tradeoff used by anti-government, anti-regulation activists: You've got to 
choose. It's either Environment or Economics. Our society cannot have 
both. In this tradeoff the little fish translates as a metaphor for 
Environmental Protection, and the Tellico Dam as Economic Progress in the 
Marketplace.65 Frustratingly, if this is the perceptual frame, the facts that 
64 Public opinion is built around PFs, and a given story targets a PF, and then it grows, or 
changes. Courts are supposed to use a more objective PF: cause of action has elements; you line 
up the elements and if they fit, you get whatever finding of liability therein provided, and' move 
to the remedy. Some judges merely fit each case into their own PFs and disregard facts, logic, 
and precedent that don't fit, but Chief Justice Burger's opinion was a rejection of such 
unfettered judicial process. Instead he bought our Saxian argument that this should be 
remanded to Congress, where of course we had to face the unfettered PF. 
65 See generally CHARLES C. MANN & MARK L. PLUMMER, NOAH'S CHOICE: THE FuTuRE OF 
ENDANGERED SPECIES (1995). Noah's Choice is a beautifully written book, ostensibly seeking to 
bring a rational societal overview to the field. It surveys many of the scientific delights and 
philosophical challenges of endangered species conservation and advances several major lines 
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show the dam's diseconomies just don't register in the picture. Once, right 
after the Supreme Court verdict, I spent more than an hour on the telephone 
with two researchers for the most respected journalist in America, CBS's 
Walter Cronkite. To prepare the eminent anchorman for that evening's 
newscast on Tellico they took copious notes on project costs, dubious 
benefits, and the public's lucrative alternatives to the dam. Eagerly we 
waited for America finally to hear the story straight. But "In a classic 
confrontation between environment and energy production," intoned our 
suddenly-fallen icon, "the $150 billion Tellico hydroelectric dam was stopped 
this week by a two-inch endangered minnow. "66 The fish/dam perceptual 
frame was too powerful, the cute juxtaposition too seductive. This dam got 
bigger in the telling, and, as Cecil Andrus once said, "This is the only fish 
story I know where the fish keeps getting smaller." 
Ai; the darter's defense team, we continually racked our brains, 
consciously looking for ways to form a new perceptual frame. How could we 
re-cast the snail darter in order to open the Press and the public's perceptual 
frame to the valuable benefits of the darter and the flaws and detriments of 
the dam? Besides literally hundreds of conversations briefing reporters, we 
held public teach-ins, had bumper stickers: "It's More Than A Little Fish," 
wrote close to a hundred op-eds and letters to editors, and even released a 
bluegrass record: "(Dam the TVA and) Save the Little T." How about using 
the "canary in the coal mine" as a perceptual frame? Endangered species in 
their natural habitats can serve human interests in the same way as when 
nineteenth century miners carried canaries down into the coal seams, 
knowing that when the sensitive little species began to show harm from 
odorless methane coal gas, it gave warning that there was a serious threat to 
humans as well, identifying and protecting human welfare. G7 If the fish-
of argument. One is that we get very limited tangible benefits from the ESA and that, in effect, 
the ESA is a practical failure because few species have been successfully removed from the 
endangered list. Noah's Choice also notes the powerful perverse incentives the Act gives, 
especially to private property interests, to subvert its protections. The authors do not take these 
as reasons to strengthen the Act. Rather, after asserting the lack of success of the ESA and 
downplaying collateral species protection benefits, they argue that the undoubtedly substantial 
cost of species preservation is a fundamental reason to back down. Their main argument then, 
as the book's title indicates, is that endangered species pose an inescapable loaded choice: If we 
as a society want to save species for whatever their charms, we would have to ratchet back 
living standards and pay trillions of dollars; otherwise, we must regretfully override endangered 
species according to whatever may be dictated by the marketplace. Interestingly, apropos of 
this Essay, Noah's Choice appears to be written to "frame" the congressional debates over the 
Endangered Species Act as an issue of all-or-nothing tradeoffs, either accepting the logic of the 
marketplace industries that oppose the Act-timber, mining, grazing, real estate-or 
bankrupting the economy to achieve species protections. The authors also egregiously fail to 
note what appears to be their intimate personal connections to the resource-exploitation 
industries. Id. But see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Noah by the Numbers: An Empirical Evaluation of 
the Endangered Species Act, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 356 (1997) (reviewing Mann & Plummer and 
contesting the conclusion that the ESA is a failure). 
66 CBS Evening News (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 31,1977). 
67 See Oliver A. Houck, Why Do We Protect Endangered Species, and What Does That Say 
About Whether Restrictions on Private Property to Protect Them Constitute "Takings"?, 80 IOWA 
L. REV. 297, 301 (1995); Embattled Social Utilities, supra note 37, at 883. 
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versus-dam cliche could be recast by reframing the endangered fish as a 
canary, offering a signal opportunity to the legal system to protect the 
endangered human resources in the valley, then the new frame would open 
up the merits of the case to anyone who looked through it. Since then, the 
canary metaphor has become commonplace, but in the years we flogged it 
around Washington and the journalist staffs of the national press, it never 
caught on for the snail darter. We also tried the frame of "endangered 
species as barometers"-because the primary cause of endangerment was 
habitat disruption, the existence of an endangered species signaled that the 
continuation of its habitat qualities was likewise threatened for humans. 
(The frames we pushed, it may be noted, focused on utilitarian arguments 
for human welfare, to counteract the implication of environmental 
aestheticism and intangibles in the fish/dam cliche.) It was all to no avail.68 
Why didn't the perceptual frame evolve? 
Perhaps in part it was inertia. Once a frame is established, it tends to 
hold on. A rolling stone gathers momentum. To reverse it, and admit that 
they had gotten it backwards, the media would implicitly have had to eat a 
lot of crow. 
In part it was a consciously manipulated tool. TVA's public relations 
department sidestepped criticism of the dam on its merits, but continually 
distributed materials for the Press that reinforced the cliche-a photo clip 
handout showing the dam (photographed with a wide-angle lens to increase 
its mass) juxtaposed against a close-up of a little darter lying on a stiff cold 
lab table alongside a ruler calibrating its diminutive size. Others in the anti-
regulation industrial community leapt upon the fish-versus-dam icon in their 
press releases and lobbying materials, to further their initiatives against 
environmentalism. 
In some cases it undoubtedly reflected political biases in the Press. 
Local reporters in Tennessee reported that their editors did not welcome the 
idea of investigative stories about Tellico. One reporter from the Lenoir City 
paper confessed to us, "I know a lot about the Tellico project, and you are 
. right, it's nuts. But my publisher won't let me write a word about this." So 
stories continued with superficial reporting on the latest maneuvers between 
the fish and the dam. Another time we spent half a precious afternoon in 
Washington with a Wall Street Journal reporter who came to talk to us at the 
Friends of the Earth office at Betsy Aigle's request. He poured through the 
maps and data with us and was obviously taken with the case. He told us 
that, in economic terms, this project demonstrated the fictions of the pork 
barrel, and our iI\iunction certainly seemed to deserve more respect than it 
was getting in the media. "So what will you write aboJ1t Tellico?" we asked. 
He paused, shook his head, and told us regretfully, "Nothing. It's against our 
editorial policy." "But you don't write for the editorial page. You are a news 
reporter!" He sighed and said that was correct, but the Wall Street Journals 
68 Perhaps we should have pushed the fanners' story as a wedge into opening up the 
realities of the case, although that would have cast the endangered fish as a seemingly cynical 
ploy. The fanners rightly or wrongly thought that, having failed in the earlier NEPA suit, their 
participation would seem like an inappropriate "second bite at the apple." 
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editors didn't want to run news. stories where environmentalists made 
economic sense. 
The snail darter seemed sometimes to get bias from both sides. Already 
in the 1970s, media concentration had gathered force, and the ideological 
tendency in most media empires seemed inclined toward the marketplace 
and the right, making the anti-regulationist mockery of the darter a repetitive 
theme of their coverage. More than one "liberal" reporter, however, 
mentioned to us that they had been raised on the progressive New Deal 
image of FDR's TVA dams bringing social progress to a benighted region. 
They were distressed that we were urging them to think of the agency as just 
another calcified giant utility, vested with extraordinary governmental 
powers.69 
ANOTHER BASIC PROBLEM: INFOTAINMENT: THE PRESS IS A 
BUSINESS 
In greater part, however, it probably was because the fish/dam cliche 
meshed so well with tendencies and pathologies within the American press 
process itself. The frustrating and ultimately destructive persistence of the. 
fish/dam frame reflects basic perplexities of today's media. 
How does the media decide whether to cover a story, and in what 
depth? The most compelling explanations come down to "Infotainment"-
the broadcast news departments' perceived need to be attractive and 
engaging to their desired audience by producing quick and catchy news 
segments, and the print press's unfortunate perceived need to fight for 
market share with the broadcasters. The Press's news and information 
function, so important to the functioning of modem democracy, is thus 
generically dominated by the need to attract larger audiences and market 
share. This de facto market competition requires that both print and 
broadcast news departments compete with other formats to attract and hold 
the attention of audiences that have a wide variety of seductively diverting 
options available. Complexity is a problem, as are stories that are repetitive, 
distressing "downers," or are overly intellectual or serious. 
"You need a peg, or hook for reporters to hang the story on, and to 
catch the attention of their editors," Charles Eisendrath of University of 
Michigan's Natural Resources Journalism program told us. "If the story you 
69 There had been much earlier warnings that the media was subject to political pressures 
from TVA. In 1969, the year Congress passed NEPA, Justice Douglas wrote an extended expose 
of Tellico, with photographs, analyzing the project's deficits and the extraordinary development 
potential available for river valley agriculture and tourism, strongly hinting that it should be 
enrolled in the Wild and Scenic River System. National Geographic agreed to publish it! The 
citizens thought they had scored a coup, and now America would see what really was at stake 
in the valley. But TVA found out about the article's imminence, called National Geographic's 
editor, Frederick G. Vosburgh, and persuaded him to cut it. TVA carried its suasion to other 
magazines. Justice Douglas ultimately was able to find only one national periodical to publish 
the article. He added fishing details and some heavy sarcasm and published it in True, a men's 
magazine, where it ran behind a cover of a bathing beauty on the beach, and needless to say, it 
did not build an informed public debate. William O. Douglas, This Valley Wails To Die, TRUE: 
FOR TODAY'S MAN, May 1969, at 40. 
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want is Tellico's benefits, costs, and alternatives, then you have to give them 
heartwanning fanners, or Indians, or use the Great Man theory, finding some 
figure who commands big time media attention to be tied to the story."70 
Good pegs or hooks don't just get one story run. They justify running a 
second and third take on a story with new spins and angles. 71 Ward Sinclair 
was able to get a second ESA story into the Washington Post one week, and 
on page two at that, because, as he told us, it had such a cool quoted phrase, 
"pork panic," in the lead paragraph and headline. But note: such pegs are 
themselves a part of the infotainment phenomenon. The implicit query is 
"Will this pull, titillate, and hold a desired audience?" 
We heard about this need for "titillations" from colleagues at Syracuse 
University's S.1. Newhouse School of Public Communications when· we 
asked them to explain how the Press decides what to cover in their papers 
and broadcasts. As one said, "Well, you have really asked The Big Question. 
[Although] the short answer is: Nobody really knows, the 'standard' answer 
seems to be 'Whatever they [or their editor] think their reader/viewer will be 
1nterested in."'72 Most news departments, they said, use some version of a 
common list of factors in deciding what to publish: 
• conflict 
• impact 
• interest (of audience) 
• novelty 
• prominence (people, institutions, etc.) 
• proximity 
• timeliness. 73 
Note that these factors, which the Tellico story would seem to possess, 
all appear to embody attractor-stimulators likely to pull in readers and 
viewers, but, perhaps in some cases, can also serve the societally important 
public-information function. "Two other criteria sometimes used are 'news 
that educates' and 'news that explains (democracy, system, process, etc).~"74 
70 We tried all of these, inviting reporters to Tennessee, bringing farmers and Cherokees to 
the Press in Washington, unsuccessfully trying to bring Ralph Nader, Robert Redford, Chip 
Carter (the President's son) and others, even Dolly Parton, who was born nearby, to come 
forward publicly for the darter and the river. 
As the danl was being closed, a compelling story by Peter Matthiessen finally appeared in 
the New York Review of Books, chronicling his visit to the desecrated Cherokee sacred sites at 
Tellico. See Peter Matthiessen, How to Kill a Valley, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 7, 1980, at 31. "The 
New York press really respects Matthiessen and the NYRB," we were told. "If only they had run 
that story earlier, you would have gotten all the press you needed going down there to 
Tennessee to investigate your Valley." 
71 Stories develop a "news climate." If a story goes too long without new spins or the 
perceived potential for satisfying resolution, it becomes off-putting old news. 
72 E-mails from Barbara Croll Fought & Patricia H. Longstaff, Professors, Syracuse 
University, S.l. Newhouse School of Public Communications, to David E. Cole, Research 
Assistant, Boston College Law School (July 25, 2001) [hereinafter Fought & Longstaff e-mails] 
(on file with author). 
73 Id. 
74 Id.; see also JERRY £.ANSON & BARBARA CROLL FOUGHT, NEWS IN A NEW CENTURY: 
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These latter factors seem more directly civic-minded, serving the 
informational needs of society, but our Newhouse colleagues indicate that 
they accordingly may be a gdod deal less common: "The cynical answer is, 
[reporters report] 'whatever they can get easily (without a lot of research)' 
and the REALLY cynical answer is 'Whatever has sex and violence."'75 On 
this matrix, we would have thought that the Tellico Dam story's details, 
though lacking in sex and violence, would have registered on all scores. It 
could be played as infotainment-a dramatic conflict with impact on 
national wildlife and public works policy, with an intriguing mix of fish, 
farmers, and Indians, a new twist on the ecology/economics debate, the 
mighty TVA. in Tennessee, all-America's country home, and a timely 
congressional battle-as well as serious civic information. It was not to be. 76 
Not all reporters are competentjoumalists,77 but as even good reporters 
resignedly informed us, "It's a business. It's infotainment." The Press is not a 
REPORTING IN AN AGE OF CONVERGING MEDIA (1999) (noting that today's audience wants to know 
how news events will affect daily life). 
75 Fought & Longstaff e-mails, supra note 72. In a study of press sensationalism that focused 
on the Tellico Dam case, the authors were deeply critical of how the story was consistently 
trivialized in both the Knoxville paper and the New York Times: 
The press can be neither condemned nor absolved of responsibility for the 
sensationalism that existed in the articles .... It seems that the more unique an issue, the 
more likely it will be treated in a sensational fashion .... An event for the press must 
have inherent news value-a "quickening urgency" befitting newsroom codes .... Since 
news space is limited, [editors) decide what is "newsworthy" a~d what is "extraneous" in 
headlines, leads, and major parts of news articles. Given such organizational constraints, 
one can better understand why the snail darter captured the attention of both the local 
and national press, and why the less "newsy" long-term issues, such as the dam's impact 
on the economy, environment, and culture, did not. 
Carroll J. Glynn & Albert R. Tims, Environmental and Natural Resource Issues: Press 
Sensationalism, in TRANSACTIONS OF THE 45TH NORTH AMERICAN WILDLIFE AND NATURAL 
RESOURCES CONFERENCE 99, 109 (1980). 
76 Perhaps the closest we got to an investigative inquiry into the merits of Tellico came in 
September 1979 when we were able to sit down with Charles Seabrook of the Atlanta 
Constitution. He took our data sheets, maps, charts, and chronologies home and called back 
excitedly, "They want me to do this story. There is a Pulitzer in this story, and everyone has 
missed it!" Seabrook came to Tennessee in October, interviewing a dozen citizens around the 
Valley. Unfortunately, however,· on October 20th, when he came to a mass rally of river 
defenders at Echota on the meadows along the Little Tennessee, some dam supporters had put 
nails on the access road and called in a threat that proved to be twelve sticks of dynamite 
planted in a bush in the middle of our meeting ground. Given the flat tires, the bomb scare (the 
dynamite proved to have no blasting cap igniters), and a small grass fire under his car caused by 
its overheated catalytic converter, Seabrook apparently decided he'd had enough, 
unceremoniously left the rally, and drove home. No investigative story, no Pulitzer. 
77 Inaccuracy and incompleteness are endemic. How many of you have read news stories 
about something you personally knew a lot about? And what did you find there? Reporters are 
often not very hardworking, or some are too hardworking with too much to do in too little time. 
Occasionally, reporters are unintelligent or uneducated. Several top rank reporters spoke 
despairingly to us of university communications majors: "Why don't they learn a science or a 
language or an era of history or political philosophy? Something rigorous that teaches them to 
think and gives them something. to think about? If you major in communications, you are 
majoring in nothing." 
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civic utility. "The whole operation is keyed to the bottom line."78 So what 
gets covered? Stuff that the editors or producers believe will attract a 
sufficiently rewarding large audience, and these decisions tum on what the 
editors or producers think of their audiences. Their'image of their audience 
does not appear to be civically inspiring. The AP wire service's legislative 
beat man in Washington at the time, Dave Espo, told us, "We are warned not 
to pitch our writing level any higher than eighth grade, because otherwise 
we will lose the significant core of our audience. Only the Times, the Post, 
and WSJ reporters are allowed to write at a high school graduate level or 
higher." Who are the editors and producers pitching for? In a post-modem 
age of lowered societal aspirations,79 is Horner Simpson the Press's image of 
America? What about the civic information role? "Why," we asked Espo, 
"don't you write stories that inform the public and members of Congress 
about the facts of the Tellico case when critical votes are about to be taken 
in the committees or on the floor?" "You'd like me to do that, wouldn't you?," 
Espo responded, sensing that the very fact of national reporting on the 
reasoning behind our public interest issues would shift political outcomes. 
"But you don't understand. Our role isn't to make the news. We just report it 
after it happens." 
To be sure, some issues and perceptual frames have such obvious 
gravitas that it is clear to the media editors that they must receive serious 
coverage, even if it is not clear that the audience will stay tuned or read the 
text. On some such issues, but very few, it is clear to the Press itself that it 
has a civic duty to inform society on those matters or happenings. (Hence, 
78 The phenomenon is especially visible in broadcast journalism. The PBS documentary 
Local News focuses on "the struggle to reconcile honorable journalism with profitable 
television," on the assumption that "the health of the press ... is directly proportional to the 
health of the country. If it's sick, the country is sick. But how do YO!J get the public interested in 
the efforts to do good journalism, to understand the pressures against doing it?" Samuel G. 
Freedman, Fighting to Balance Honor and Profit on the Local News, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, 
sec. 2, at 26 (quoting co-producer Calvin Skaggs). "I oftentimes wonder," says Mike Redding, a 
reporter for WCNC in Charlotte, North Carolina, 
if they ought to just scrap the ratings and let us go back to telling stories that are 
important. Not because they're the ones we feel will get us the numbers .... In every 
decision that's made, there's a push and pull between wanting to do a high-quality job 
and then needing to absolutely cover the stuff that we know people will watch. 
[d. Keith Connors, the news director who battles this conflict, wistfully observes, "If this is only 
all about a number to get a rating to get a dollar,. .. well, then, it's a shallow, vacant, 
meaningless pursuit." [d. at 36. He hopes that "If you do things the right way, you can still win. 
You don't have to succumb to t-and-a, flash and trash, murder and mayhem." [d. In the end 
WCNC exceeded its revenue objectives. [d. 
79 
[There is a] profound cultural shift that both accompanies and feeds on the current 
deadening of political debate. High culture and low culture have flip-flopped in what may 
at first have seemed a welcome overthrow of elitism, but has instead encouraged the 
magnification of trivia, and the discrediting of substantive debate on the grounds that it 
isn't entertaining. 
Jay Carr, Celluloid Zeroes With Few Exceptions, This Summer's Dismal Movies Shortchange 
Art for Easy Box-Office Bucks, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 24, 2001, at C1. 
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for instance, boring, low-rated, presidential-nominating conventions 
nevertheless get covered.) 
But, while the fish/dam perceptual frame grabbed reporters, this snail 
darter story, as covered, did not convey any sense of gravitas. It was 
fundamentally a light-hearted juxtaposition, which by its nature did not 
invite probing inquiry. It was such a ready and useful quip-familiar, 
dynamic, diverting (in both senses of the word), a matrix upon which news 
stories could easily be written without a lot of investigative work. 
Compare this simplicity to the difficulties of telling the full story, trying 
to shift to a perceptual frame of the contrasting merits of the dam and the 
river. The canary-in-the-coal-mine required a lot of research and explaining. 
It wasn't light. In fact, it was doubly depressing to report because first, it 
would open the disquieting possibility that you cannot rely on government 
systems to work rationally, second, that TVA was not the historic 
progressive success story we wanted it to be, and third, that the little fish 
story that had been chuckh::d and churned over for thirty-six months turns 
out to be backwards. The Press had been gulled. 
Could this sad journalistic tale recur today? Tellico was the focus of the 
Society of Environmental Journalists' (SEJ) 1999 National Convention in 
Chattanooga, Tennessee. The overwhelming consensus of the reporters 
there, most of whom said that, despite the fish/dam story's notoriety, they 
themselves had never heard the internal facts of the dam controversy, was 
that the Press could well miss the real story again today. Infotainment is in 
some ways stronger; publishers are even less civically active and the 
environmental beat has lost some of its earlier cachet. Getting editors or 
producers to authorize an extended or an in-depth story remains as difficult 
today, unless the story has a sexy hook or an on-rolling "news climate." 
John Cushman, environmental reporter for the New York Times, 
strongly disagrees.8o The Times, he says, covers many issues that are "eat-
your-broccoli stories," where his paper in effect says to the American public, 
"You may not actively desire these stories, but read them, they're good for 
you." He describes Times reporters, at least, as guided by four journalistic 
mandates: 1) to transmit information necessary to the improvement of 
society, 2) to shake the readership out of their complacency, 3) to give voice 
to the voiceless, and 4) to demand access uncompromiSingly to information 
held within the government. Reporters, he insisted, are trained to be open-
minded in the sense of taking in information from all perspectives and 
listening deeply to reasoned presentations. Biases are inevitable, but good 
reporters will constrain themselves so that they do not write in a committed 
way until they know the facts and have processed them rationally. He agrees 
that a news story, in order to shape public policy, generally must be 
repeated. Repetition builds the kind of "news climate" that shapes public 
policy. He firmly believes, however, that the Press today would give the 
Tellico Dam story repeated coverage in all its important details. He couldn't, 
80 Mr. Cushman served as a discussant at an Environmental Law Workshop addressing a 
draft of this Essay, at Georgetown University Law Center, on October 25, 2001. His comments 
are reported from notes taken during that workshop by the author. 
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however, explain the inaction of the series of New York Times reporters-
including Phil Shabecoff, Boyce Rensburger, Charles Mohr, Ben Franklin, 
Phil Boffey, Jack Rosenthal, Tom Farrell, and Drummond Ayres-whom we 
had variously begged unsuccessfully over a span of six years to bring the 
details of the Tellico story to light. The SEJ correspondents' judgment seems 
more believable: today, as in the 1970s, the Tellico case's merits would still 
come across to producers, editors, and reporters as a broccoli story, so a 
variety of extraneous factors would determine whether the story ever got 
the coverage it deserved. 
THREE CLOSING SUGGESTIONS 
. For better or worse, the Press is the de facto national information 
service providing the majority of operative information that shapes the 
public policy debates of the day. The degree to which it does or does not 
fulfill its role of informing public perceptions has great civic consequences. 
Let me clarify what is not my proposition here: I am not advocating that 
all public interest cases must get the intelligent deep investigative national 
coverage that it seems obvious the Tellico Dam and the darter should have 
received. There are far too many environmental issues, at too many levels. 
One cannot expect any information system to do that. Rather, I would assert 
that if our national information communication system fails even in 
extraordinarily high-profile cases like Tellico, so that the insider calculus of 
the political marketplace ends up bulldozing the public interest, then it is 
clear that our current system of governance, if it is to do what we need 
government to do, urgently requires some systemic improvements for 
communicating infornlation in cases at all levels .. (You are a part of this.) 
. Propelled by the frustrating lessons in government we in Tennessee 
learned from Tellico, I propose three concurrent suggestions for 
improvement. 
1. EXHORT THE PRESS TO ITS HIGH CIVIC DUTIES. 
If we think that Thomas Jefferson was right that the only "safe 
depository of the ultimate powers of the society [is] the people themselves," 
it is indeed important to "inform their discretion. "81 Who in the lightning-
paced complexities of our society today is to inform the people effectively, if 
not the Press? Administrative agencies? The brigades of lobbyists who work 
throughout government? The schools and universities whose lead time is 
measured in years? Congress? The Governors and the President? For better 
and for worse the Press is our national information-supply system and the 
most important game in town that can make a difference. So it is useful to 
try to encourage the Press to step up to the plate on its societal role. Marc 
Landyia, a valued colleague of mine in political science warns, "For 220 
years thoughtful observers have urged that the performance of the Press is 
crucial and must be improved, and what has happened? Which way is it 
81 Jefferson, supra note 1, at 278. 
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going?"_ James Fallows has abandoned hope in the Press. Business chains 
have replaced family ownership, etc. Infotainment marketing rules! But 
there is a large societal stake in moving public discourse away from the 
trivial and superficial and toward meaning and substance, and the Fourth 
Estate has a heritage and mandate that include aspirations higher than profit 
margins. Perhaps in the new circumstances of today, in the grim shadow of 
the towers that are no longer there, this is not as empty a hope as it may 
have seemed a year ago. 
2. BECOME PRESS-SAVVY 
Public interest attorneys especially must recognize that press savviness 
is an important professional skill in their legal training and practice. There 
are many angles to be explored. Here are a few: 
-Write every complaint so its first paragraphs could be lead paragraphs 
in the AP wire service story. 
-Name the case so it makes your case with the Press. In retrospect, 
what line of entry best simplifies the necessary full perceptual frame for the 
Tellico Dam case? The farmers. We tried but failed to get the Press to focus 
on the farmers whose homelands were being condemned for TVA resale and 
development. 1 am convinced that if only I had named the case Tellico 
Farmers v. TV A, the river would still be flowing. When reporters called down 
to Tennessee, they asked to speak with Hank Hill, the first-named plaintiff. 
Hank could talk for hours on technical details, but he also is a bright, fiery 
speaker, so the Press tended to focus on his punchy sound bites about TVA's 
illegitimate parentage. If I had named it Tellico Farmers, every reporter 
would have wanted to talk to a farmer and quickly would have learned about . 
the farmlands being taken, most for resale and dubious redevelopment, and 
off we'd go on the merits. 
-Argue common sense as well as law. Briefs and legal arguments miss 
the point if they are restricted to technical legal artistry. No decision maker 
wants to go home at the end of the day saying, "I issued an order today that 
the press will say doesn't make cornmon sense." 
-Speak to reporters with sound bites and photos, have B-roll82 available, 
82 B-roJl is the video footage on unsolicited cassettes supplied for free, along with written 
materials, to hundreds of news outlets across America by industrial lobbyists seeking to shape 
public perceptions of their issues. It contains generic images that can be cut into the nightly TV 
newscasts as news footage or as a backdrop for the heads of newscasters. For a chemical 
manufacturing story, for instance, the industry lobbyists' B-roJl would show a plant in the hazy 
background, with nesting birds and kids fishing in the foreground. A timber lobbyists' video clip 
would not show clear-cuts, but rather a father and son pair of lumberjacks neatly trimming a 
selectively cut tree. The strip mine lobbyists' B-roll would show manicured excavations and 
spotless reclamation. To discredit their opposition, the industries' B-roll would show a few 
scruffy anarchist hoodlun1S would dominate B-roJl images of debates on international 
envirolmlental accords. 
In contrast, B-roll downloadable from a public interest information archive would show 
less idyllic, less sanitized views of industrial production and resource extraction and on 
international environmental debates would show peaceful, middle class demonstrators 
marching by the thousands or soberly discussing the countervailing tendencies of unhindered, 
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prepare handout primer sheetS with conceptual images that provide 
effective perceptual frames, with quotable quotes, and follow-up contact 
information. Remember to pass all that you say to the Press through a filter 
that tests whether this is what you want to have come out in the reported 
story. Otherwise you cannot know which of your ramblings will be plucked 
out and published. Note: Becoming a press impresario may be unethical. 
Some jurisdictions appear to hold that attorneys in litigation must confine 
their communications with the Press to the official record. This is often an 
impossible constraint where the public interest attorney is the only effective 
spokesperson regularly available, while opposing counsel have PR firms on 
retainer. (TVA had a large press office as well as a corps of lobbyistS.) 
-Use graphics all the time. The legal profession is largely stuck in the 
eighteenth century in itS hesitation to mobilize graphic representations-
maps, charts, photos-of the facts, places, and things that will move their 
cases in the eyes of juries, judges, governmental officials, and the Press. 
-Use your momentS in the klieg lights wisely. In the Supreme Court we 
defeated Attorney General Griffin Bell, who appeared rather hapless before 
the Justices. On the Court's steps, however, Bell beat us flat out. When the 
reporters and cameras swarmed around him, he raised a little bottle with a 
dead darter in it, and said, "This is what it is all about." When the reporters 
turned to us, I blew it. If I had said, "Mr. Bell wants you to focus on just that 
little fish, so you won't look at the river valley habitat where it is 
endangered. But look deeper and you'd see that this little dam is really a big 
turkey, a boondoggle .... The fish can save a precious river valley and 340 
family farms .... Mr. Bell doesn't want you to see the amazing truths you'd 
fmd if the press looked into this case .... " Instead, I pigheadedly voiced 
several variations on "Weare trying to teach a federal agency to obey the 
law," totally missing our prime opportunity to focus international attention 
onto the farmers and public economic values being jeopardized by an 
incredibly stupid dam, and incidentally reinforcing the impression that we 
were standing on a mere statutory technicality, not common sense. 
-You get the idea .... 
3. A PUBLIC INTEREST INFORMATION ARCHIVE 'IN CYBERSPACE? 
A fmal modest proposal: Could the miracle of the Internet be at least a 
partial solution to the problem of building informed public perceptions? 
Here is one final hypothesis for changing modem democracy through the 
hyper-capabilities of modem communication technology. Take for example 
the congressional pork barrel's reaction to Secretary Andrus's letter. The 
pork barrel insiders knew that they could operate without regard to the 
public merits because the public did not know the merits.83 
global marketplace economics and long-term global civic values. 
83 Similarly in the 104th Contract-with-America Congress, when the industrial anti-
regulationist movement literally took over the legislative process, the players were 
unconstrained by the Press because it was unable to cope with the rush of legislative assaults 
that avalanched the capital. 
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If every member of Congress who stood to make a speech against the 
ESA and the snail darter-about how endangered species were 
impoverishing the South, or allowing houses to catch fire in kangaroo rat 
habitat in California, or blocking huge hydroelectric dams, or stopping 
thousands of economic projects across the nation-knew that reporters 
could go to one comprehensive public interest information website where 
their allegations would be laid out and contradicted by the facts, then the 
debate would tend to move closer to the truth. Such a website could contain 
a compendium of different environmental issue sectors, each with 
summaries of the opposing assertions and authoritative presentations of the 
public interest C3$e, charts, maps, data, sound bites, lists of published 
sources and experts available to respond to reporters' queries, online 
photographs and B-roll video footage. Reporters themselves would be 
straightened-up by the knowledge that if they wrote stories that ignored 
information readily available in one consistent authoritative location, they 
would be revealed as incompetent. Such an experiment should be worth 
trying for civic-minded foundations willing to risk a couple million dollars in 
a high-aspiration venture that could change the nature of modem public 
policy discourse in government. 84 
If one or more of these three suggestions were to pick up some speed 
and traction, we, the minions of TVA v. Hill, could rest a bit easier knowing 
that some systemic good has come from the lessons of our seven painful 
years trying to help a fish in a pork barrel. 
84 Successful implementation of such a public interest informational archive would 
obviously spawn corollary opposing archives that would be far better funded and sponsored by 
the short-term profit-maximizing perspectives of the marketplace. However, the resulting 
facilitated marketplace of information would by its nature delve deeper into the factual realities 
and logic of the issues. Most public interest advocates seem to believe implicitly that complex 
facts, when comprehensively explored and analyzed, ultimately lead to progressive conclusions. 
Thus, leveling the playing field of access to the information communication process, on 
balance, would ultimately serve the progressive public interest as well as the Hohnesian ideal of 
a free market in ideas. 
